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THE INHERENT STRUCTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW
Joshua P. Davis and Joshua D. Rosenberg*

To date no one has discovered a set of organizing principles for free speech
doctrine, an area of the law that has been criticized as complex, ad hoc, and even
incoherent. We provide a framework that distills free speech law down to three
judgments: the first about the role of government; the second about the target of
government regulation; and the third a constrained cost-benefit analysis. The framework can be summarized by three propositions: first, the Constitution constrains government if it regulates private speech, but not if government speaks, sponsors speech
or restricts expression in managing an internal governmental function; second, government regulation is subject to the Free Speech Clause only if it targets communication;
and, third, government regulation targeting communication is constitutional if it survives a constrained cost-benefit analysis. We first set forth our general theory and
provide examples of its explanatory power. We then argue that our framework finds
confirmation in the works of three renowned scholars: Dean Robert Post of Yale Law
School on role of government, Professor Jed Rubenfeld of Yale Law School on the
target of government regulation and the constraints on balancing, and Judge Richard
Posner on cost-benefit analysis. The work of these scholars supports our position in
two ways: first, each agrees with part of our framework; and, second, the writings of
each are unpersuasive to the extent they are at odds with our rational reconstruction
of free speech law.
INTRODUCTION
Free speech law seems to be an intricate tangle. Commentators routinely criticize
it as unduly complicated, incoherent, and counterintuitive. As to the first of these
points, scholars have characterized free speech doctrine as “maddeningly complex”1
* The authors are, respectively, Professor and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, USF
School of Law and Professor, USF School of Law. This project has benefited from the suggestions of John Adler, Bill Bassett, Chris Eisgruber, Susan Freiwald, Tristin Green, David
Greene, Bill Hing, Tim Iglesias, Richard Leo, Maya Manian, Julie Nice, Judge Richard Posner,
Robert Post, Bruce Price, Jed Rubenfeld, Ronald Rotunda, Michelle Travis and Mark Tushnet.
We are particularly grateful to Robert Post, who has provided extensive comments and constructive criticism about our framework. We thank Royce Barber, Brian Davies, Nick Larson,
Erika Nusser, and Chris O’Connell for excellent research assistance.
1
Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the
Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 274 (2009). John H. Garvey and Frederick Schauer
similarly comment:
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and ad hoc, consisting of a host of unrelated “three- and four-part tests.”2 For this
reason, treatises, casebooks and law review articles dutifully divide government interference with speech into numerous and proliferating categories, addressing each one
largely on its own terms.3
In this section we begin by asking why the architecture of the First
Amendment is so complicated. Law students are not the only ones who
yearn for more simplicity. Courts who apply the law would make fewer
mistakes if the law were less complex. And public and private actors
would have an easier time conforming their behavior to the contours of
the Constitution.
John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 172 (2d ed. 1996);
see also Elana Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 515 (1996) (noting the “technical,
complex classificatory schemes” of the First Amendment have “become only more intricate,
as categories have multiplied, distinctions grown increasingly fine, and exceptions flourished
and become categories of their own”); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the
First Amendment, U. PA. L. REV. 615, 616 (1991) (“The doctrinal web surrounding the free
speech clause of the first amendment is one of the most complicated and confusing areas in
constitutional law.”).
2
Frederick Schauer describes free speech doctrine as involving “vague definitions, marginally (at best) useful three- and four-part tests, and slippery and hard to apply categories.”
Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256,
1278 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Institutional]; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical
Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 938 (2009)
(“First Amendment Doctrine is sometimes criticized for its complex array of rules, which
some consider more suitable for a tax code than a statement of constitutional principle.”).
3
As Erwin Chemerinsky, perhaps our greatest organizer of constitutional doctrine, has
stated, “Simply put, it is not possible to comprehensively flowchart the First Amendment as
a defined series of questions in a required sequential order. There are many ways of approaching and evaluating government actions restricting expression.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 932 (3d ed. 2006). His treatise thus addresses
free speech in a typical manner, subdividing the topic based on, inter alia, the methodology of
analysis (including content-based vs. content-neutral; vagueness; overbreadth; prior restraints;
defining infringements of speech); types of unprotected and less protected speech (incitement;
fighting words, the hostile audience, and racist speech; sexually oriented speech; reputation,
privacy, and publicity; symbolic speech; government employee speech; attorneys’ speech; labor
picketing and protests); and the location of speech (government properties; private property;
speech in authoritarian environments, such as the military, prisons, and schools). Id. at xix.
Other scholars take a similar approach. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN
FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2002)
(discussing, inter alia, free speech rights in specific environments, coerced expression, lesser
protected categories of speech); VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2006)
(dividing free speech by individual perspective, e.g., John Milton, James Madison, John Stuart
Mill, Learned Hand, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis Brandeis, and Alexander Meiklejohn);
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND THEORY (2008)
(relying on various categories, including content-based discrimination, content-neutrality and

2010]

THE INHERENT STRUCTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW

133

The second problem is that many free speech doctrines appear incoherent.4 The
Court has at times stated, for example, that it will strike down laws that impose an
excessive incidental burden on expression.5 Yet this doctrine is notoriously anemic.6
And the Court has suggested that it would allow greater but not lesser incidental
burdens on expression. It has thus relied on this doctrine in striking down a tax that
applied only to newspapers, even though it would uphold a larger general tax that
applied to all businesses,7 and in striking down a ban on trespassing only if it is part
of the distribution of pamphlets, even though it would uphold a stricter trespassing law
that applies in general.8 The Court has not explained why a greater incidental burden
on expression is constitutional but a lesser one is not.9
Similarly, courts have upheld restrictions on expression explaining that the government’s goal was not to suppress speech itself, but only its “secondary effects.”10
They have for this reason allowed cities to zone adult movie theatres that could otherwise increase crime rates and decrease property values.11 But in other settings, courts
scrutinize laws that target expression because of its potential consequences—its
government property, symbolic speech, compelled speech, commercial speech, mass media,
sexually explicit speech, etc.); ARNOLD H. LOEWY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1999) (categories include speech v. conduct, obscenity, non-content limitations
on speech, and government as educator); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(3d ed. 2008) (addressing, inter alia, dangerous ideas and information, overbreadth, vagueness,
prior restraint, “low” value speech, and content-neutral restrictions).
4
Robert Post provides a typical view—if an unusual metaphor—when he describes it
as “danc[ing] macabrely on the edge of complete doctrinal disintegration.” Robert Post,
Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1270 (1995) [hereinafter
Post, Recuperating]; see also id. at 1275 (characterizing free speech doctrine as “notoriously
turgid and confused, thoroughly disconnected from the actual levers of its judgment”); John
Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2008) (claiming “current
speech-conduct law is incoherent”); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions:
Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1497 (2007) (noting “increasing sense” that First Amendment doctrine “has become incoherent”); Barry P. McDonald, Speech
and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1430 (2006) (describing the Supreme Court’s rules regarding content discrimination as “inconsistent, unprincipled or ad hoc”); Frederick Schauer, Codifying
the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 308–09 (1982).
5
See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45 (1994); Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co.
v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 577 (1983).
6
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1175, 1208–09 (1996); Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1264.
7
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 575.
8
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
9
See, e.g., Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 601–02 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (making
this point).
10
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986).
11
Id.
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secondary effects—including if it may lead to violence.12 As a result, the principle
behind the “secondary effects” doctrine is elusive.13
A third, related problem is that courts often fight against free speech rules to reach
sensible outcomes rather than enlisting them to assist their decision-making.14 An example is the heightened scrutiny courts are supposed to apply when government action
depends on the content of speech and, especially, its viewpoint.15 Thus, the Supreme
Court concluded that a prison warden’s screening of publications sent to prisoners to
ensure their contents do not threaten “security, good order, or discipline”16 was somehow content neutral,17 and that a ban on burning crosses with the intent to intimidate
was somehow viewpoint neutral,18 even though the Court acknowledged the “indelible”
association between this act and the Ku Klux Klan.19 A satisfactory account of the
relevance of subject and viewpoint discrimination would have to explain the Court’s
resistance to the ordinary meaning of those concepts in key cases.20
12

See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
448–49 (1969). This scrutiny has practical effects, potentially making it difficult for the
government to prevent communication that may lead to non-imminent violent acts. See also
David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957 (2002); Isaac
Molnar, Comment, Resurrecting the Bad Tendency Test to Combat Instructional Speech:
Militias Beware, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333 (1998); Bryan Yeazel, Note, Bomb-Making Manuals
on the Internet: Maneuvering a Solution Through First Amendment Jurisprudence, 16
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 279 (2002).
13
See Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1267 (criticizing secondary effects test by
saying the Court has “failed to articulate any substantive First Amendment theory to guide its
distinction between primary and secondary effects”). Scholars have reached similar conclusions
about other doctrines as well. Robert Post has noted, for example, the public forum doctrine
“has received nearly universal condemnation from commentators and is in such a state of
disrepair as to require a fundamental reappraisal of its origins and purposes.” ROBERT POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 199 n.5 (1995)
[hereinafter POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS] (citations omitted).
14
See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget
Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 134 (2008) (“[T]he Court’s malleable
definitions and inconsistent applications leave the content and viewpoint concepts especially
ripe for manipulation.”); McDonald, supra note 4, at 1430 (noting limits on content discrimination have led the Supreme Court “to develop and employ often inconsistent, unprincipled,
or ad hoc rules to allow it to reach common sense results in many cases where those results
would otherwise be elusive under current doctrine”).
15
Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 55 (2000) [hereinafter
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality] (“[T]he general rule is that content-based restrictions on
speech must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral regulations only need meet intermediate scrutiny.”).
16
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989).
17
Id. at 415–16.
18
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361–62 (2003).
19
Id. at 354.
20
The same point can be made about other free speech doctrines, including application
of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
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Given these difficulties, it is unsurprising that many scholars have despaired of
developing a general framework for free speech law. As Jim Chen recently put the
matter, in part quoting the great free speech scholar, William Van Alstyne:
The impossibility of coherent First Amendment doctrine is emerging as one of those truths susceptible to mathematical proof.
“Deriving a consistent theory of the First Amendment from the
myriad opinions of the Supreme Court represents a task similar to
defining the inside and outside of a Möbius strip; that which appears logical at one point evaporates from another perspective.”21
This Article defies conventional wisdom. It identifies an inherent structure of
free speech doctrine as entailing three judgments, one about role of government, a
second about the target of government regulation, and a third a constrained costbenefit analysis.22
In regard to the first issue, a court in a free speech case must determine whether
the government is itself acting—speaking, subsidizing speech, or performing an internal governmental function—or whether it is regulating private conduct. Government
acting on its own—a role we call “patron”23—generally is free from the constraints of
the Free Speech Clause. Government in its role as regulator is not.
The second issue before a court is the object of government regulation. If government targets a non-communicative attribute of conduct, then the Free Speech Clause
is generally inapposite. However, if government regulation aims at communication,24
a more searching inquiry is necessary.
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2441 (1996) (“[C]ourts might try to
avoid the wrong results by ignoring or stretching the doctrine, striking down a law even though
the law would pass strict scrutiny faithfully applied. This seems to happen fairly often.”).
21
Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. 1359, 1452 n.634 (2005)
(quoting WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 68 (1984)).
22
A natural issue is in what this structure inheres. Our framework, we believe, captures the
rationales—perhaps intuitive and not fully conscious—that lead judges to decide particular free
speech cases as they do. These rationales explain the coherence of the outcomes and some of
the reasoning in those cases, even though they may be at odds with the doctrines courts articulate. The understanding of judicial reasoning implicit in this explanation is consistent with
the proverbial genius of the common law in developing legal standards case by case. See,
e.g., KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 40–41 (2d ed. 1951) (discussing case by
case method of accreting rules in common law tradition). A discussion of the implications
of this model of judicial reasoning is beyond the scope of this Article.
23
We use the word “patron” in a way that derives in part from the opening paragraph of
THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 65 (Penguin Classics 1987) (“Society is produced by our
wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by
uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher.”).
24
We do not mean to take a position on whether the Free Speech Clause applies to communication, speech, expression, or some other similar concept. Nor do we seek to define any
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The final issue is whether the costs of restricting expression outweigh its benefits. But this cost-benefit analysis is constrained. Some justifications for restricting
expression are favored; others are impermissible or disfavored.25 Courts, for example,
generally do not allow government to restrict speech out of a concern that the ideas
espoused may ultimately prove persuasive and thereby lead the polity down an undesirable path.26
In sum, according to our view, application of the Free Speech Clause entails three
determinations: first, whether government regulates private conduct; second, if so,
whether the target of regulation is communication; and, third, if so, whether the relevant benefits of regulating speech outweigh the costs of its suppression. This framework situates particular disputes within an overarching structure, rendering existing
rules coherent and revealing their underlying purposes. That is not to say it makes deciding free speech cases easy. No framework can do that. But it defines the judgments courts must make.
Part I shows the capacity of our framework to organize and rationalize a great
variety of doctrines. Part I.A explains that the first judgment—about role of government—can make sense of free speech law as applied in various contexts, including
to public schools, public forums, prisons, the military, and government employees.
It can also account for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as applied to speech.
Scholars generally treat these areas of the law as discrete.27 But they all involve an
assessment of whether government itself acts or whether it regulates the conduct of
private individuals. This distinction matters because the Court has held—particularly
in recent years—that when government speaks, sponsors speech, or manages an internal
governmental function, it does not cause the kind of interference with private speech
that implicates the Constitution.28
Part I.B addresses the second judgment—about the target of government regulation—which can explain the Court’s approach to: symbolic conduct; time, place, and
manner regulations; and incidental restrictions on expression. Only if government
of those terms with precision. But see, e.g., Greenman, supra note 4, at 1340 (attempting to
define communication as a key concept for First Amendment purposes).
25
See generally Kagan, supra note 1, at 413–15 (arguing that free speech doctrine is primarily designed to identify impermissible government motives for restricting expression). A
related notion is that courts sometimes take a categorical rather than a case by case approach
to balancing the costs and benefits of restricting expression. See generally Joseph Blocher,
Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
375, 377 (2009) (discussing “categoricalism” and “balancing” in regard to free speech rights).
26
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1975) (Holmes, J., dissenting); CASS
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 155 (1995); Eugene Volokh,
Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “SituationalAltering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005).
27
See generally supra note 3. A notable exception is Robert Post. See generally POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 199–267.
28
See infra Part I.A.
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deliberately interferes with “speech” is the First Amendment at issue.29 Again, courts
and commentators often fail to detect the common thread running through these doctrines.30 Its recognition can solve various conundrums, including the confusing nature
of cases dealing with incidental burdens on expression. As Part I.B explains, the real
concern of courts in this context is pretext. They tend to scrutinize only those government actions that have a suspiciously disproportionate impact on speech. That is why
they rarely strike down laws because of their incidental effect on expression, and often
indicate they would allow greater but not lesser burdens on speech.
Part I.C deals with the third judgment—a constrained cost-benefit analysis—which
can account for a long list of contexts in which government may interfere with communication, ranging from intellectual property rights, contract, fraud, the right to privacy, defamation, and anti-harassment laws to incitement, obscenity, speech used in
the commission of crimes, and government restrictions on speech based on its so-called
“secondary effects.”31 Courts and commentators often fail to recognize that all of these
areas of the law involve balancing, treating some of them, for example, as somehow
simply beyond the scope of the First Amendment.32 Recognition of the extensive use
of balancing in free speech cases—as well as of the constraints on that balancing—can
help to reconcile doctrines that otherwise appear to conflict.
Part I.C suggests, for example, that the “secondary effects” test is best understood
as a way to give sexual speech less protection than more highly valued speech. Government generally is not free to restrict expression, even if it does so only because of
its secondary effects. But the distinction between secondary and primary effects does
some work. It gives government leeway to regulate sexual expression, while allowing
courts to strike down government regulation if it is based on an impermissible or disfavored motivation, such as disagreement with the ideas espoused, that is, because of
29

Note that if a law of general applicability—that can apply to conduct or communication—
suppresses expression because of its message, that counts as targeting speech for these purposes.
See Volokh, supra note 26, at 1278–82, 1286–87.
30
Note, however, that Rubenfeld recognizes the unifying purpose of doctrines pertaining
to symbolic conduct and incidental expressions on speech. See Jed Rubenfeld, A Reply to
Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 763 (2002) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Reply]; Jed Rubenfeld,
The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 776 (2001) [hereinafter Rubenfeld,
Purpose]. Also, the Supreme Court has described the tests for symbolic conduct and time,
place, and manner regulations as essentially the same. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798 (1989) (“[W]e have held that the O’Brien test [for symbolic conduct] ‘in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.’”
(quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984))).
31
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,52 (1986).
32
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767–68 (2004) [hereinafter
Schauer, Boundaries] (arguing that many forms of communication find no protection in
the First Amendment for reasons that are not so much legal as political, economic, social
and cultural).
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its “primary” effects.33 This kind of constrained cost-benefit analysis, Part I.C concludes, is typical of the manner in which courts assess whether the First Amendment
permits government regulation of speech.
Part I.D demonstrates the explanatory power of our framework by applying it
to one of the most important34 and confusing35 topics in free speech law, government
discrimination based on the content of expression. This area of the law makes sense
if content discrimination is understood as relevant to free speech analysis insofar as
it assists courts in identifying the role of government, the target of regulation, or the
motivation behind government action. Thus, a prison warden may censor publications
that threaten “security, good order, or discipline”36 not because doing so is content
neutral—it isn’t—but because it is part of the legitimate governmental function of
running a prison. And a state may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate not
because it is viewpoint neutral—it isn’t—but because the law is designed to prevent
a particularly threatening form of a true threat,37 not to skew debate, silence offensive
ideas, or serve some other impermissible or disfavored purpose.
Part II turns to academic analyses of free speech law. Responding to its apparent complexity and incoherence, renowned scholars have attempted to explain free
speech doctrine by emphasizing a single issue: the role of government, according to
Robert Post;38 the target of government action, according to Jed Rubenfeld;39 or a
cost-benefit analysis, according to Richard Posner.40 None of these scholars is right
or, put differently, they all are. Each captures part, but only part, of free speech law,
33

Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1278 (“[T]he Court has used the doctrine to trigger
strict scrutiny for regulations that attempt to restrict speech because of the harms that information conveyed by speech might cause.”).
34
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 15, at 50 (describing rules pertaining to
content discrimination as the core of free speech); see also Kagan, supra note 1, at 443 (“The
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech serves as the keystone of First Amendment law.”); Schauer, Institutional, supra note 2, at 1270 (noting that
“conflation of the morally and politically divergent in the service of avoiding content-based or
viewpoint-based distinctions explains much of the unalterable core of the First Amendment”).
35
See, e.g., Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1270 (describing case law on content
discrimination as “haphazard and internally incoherent”).
36
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989).
37
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003).
38
See generally POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 1–20; Robert Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1713, 1809–24 (1987) [hereinafter Post, Governance and Management]; Robert Post,
Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 172–75 (1996) [hereinafter Post, Subsidized Speech].
39
See generally Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30; Rubenfeld, Reply, supra note 30.
40
See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis,
54 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2002) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatism]; RICHARD A. POSNER, The
Speech Market, in FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 62–94 (2004) [hereinafter POSNER,
FRONTIERS].
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leaving substantial areas unexplained. Part II modifies and then synthesizes their
core insights.
Part II.A examines the work of Robert Post, which explores the first judgment
in our framework, role of government. Relying on the concept of “constitutional
domains,” he distinguishes between government’s managerial and regulatory capacities.41 Although we have some points of disagreement with Post regarding role of
government, we think his work extraordinarily valuable in that regard. But, as Part II
further argues, he has taken this insight too far, applying it where its explanatory power
is limited, that is, to the second and third judgments of our framework.
Part II.B contends that much the same can be said of Jed Rubenfeld’s analysis of
free speech law. He, too, has attempted to capture all of free speech law by emphasizing a single issue. Rubenfeld champions “purposivism,”42 claiming that government
action violates the Free Speech Clause if and only if it aims at expression (unless it does
so in response to a false factual assertion).43 Rubenfeld, like Post, does an elegant job
of uncovering a crucial principle at work in judicial decision-making—in Rubenfeld’s
case the second judgment in the framework we propose.
But a careful review establishes that Rubenfeld falls short in two regards: first, he
admits an exception to his thesis when government acts in what Post calls its managerial capacity,44 an exception which he does not adequately explain; and, second, he
fails to make sense of the many situations in which courts allow government to restrict
expression because of the harms it will otherwise cause. In other words, Part II.B
argues that Rubenfeld’s purposivism is incomplete to the extent it resists the first and
third judgments in our framework.
Part II.C explores Richard Posner’s pragmatism and his debunking of a romanticized notion of free speech. He makes a potent argument that cost-benefit analysis
is commonplace in a way that scholars and judges are reluctant to admit.45 He recognizes that far from being absolute, the right to speak freely gives way to numerous
governmental interests.46 His skepticism is valuable, as courts have not acknowledged
how often they subordinate free speech rights to other concerns.
But Posner is insufficiently attentive to the ways in which courts engage in formal
reasoning—rather than case by case balancing—in resolving free speech cases. He
questions whether formal rules are workable in the free speech arena.47 Yet he makes
41

POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 199–267.
Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 770.
43
Id. at 821.
44
Id. at 819.
45
Posner, Pragmatism, supra note 40, at 741–42.
46
Id. at 745.
47
Id. at 738. Posner’s position on this issue is a bit unclear. While at times he expresses
skepticism that free speech doctrine contains an element of formalism, at other times he qualifies this point. See, e.g., id. at 740 (suggesting free speech law is not formal at least “outside
42
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key concessions that tend to confirm our view of the formal nature of the first and
second judgments in free speech cases. Of note, he admits that government may
restrict expression when it acts in a managerial capacity48 and when its regulations
affect expression only indirectly, even if the incidental burden they place on speech
is great.49 To be sure, he treats these concessions as minor and claims that they are
ultimately justified by pragmatism.50 But they provide significant evidence that free
speech doctrine is in fact formal in just the way we suggest. In sum, Part II.C claims
that Posner’s argument supports the framework we propose, even in regard to the
formal characteristics that he is reluctant to acknowledge.
The last part concludes by suggesting a reason why Post, Rubenfeld and Posner
go astray. Our view is that each introduces too much of his own position on what
the law should be into an inquiry about what the law is. At first blush, this assertion
may seem to rely on a strongly positivist view of law, a view that draws a strong
distinction between law and morality.51 But, as the conclusion explains, our project
can be understood in terms of the concept of “fit” as set forth by Ronald Dworkin,52
perhaps positivism’s most forceful critic.53 Our claim is that our framework fits the
pattern of judicial decisions better than competing academic accounts and better than
the rules courts articulate.
Indeed, the tendency of scholars to distort their description of free speech law to
match their normative preferences has a counterpart in judicial reasoning. According
to this view, the confusing nature of free speech doctrine may reflect judicial discomfort with the limited protection courts afford speech. To be clear, we do not assert bad
faith. But the legal niceties courts have invented may allow them to avert their gaze
from what they have wrought. If so, what is necessary is a ruthless attention to the
pattern of free speech cases that places a much higher priority on description than prescription. With the misleading veneer of free speech law removed, and its underlying
structure laid bare, judges, lawyers, and scholars will be in a better position to identify
the key issues in free speech cases and, where appropriate, to make clear-eyed and
cool-headed recommendations for reform.
the heartland of settled law”). But see E-mail from Judge Richard A. Posner, United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to Joshua P. Davis, Professor, University of San
Francisco School of Law (Jan. 24, 2010, 09:38 EST) (on file with author) (“I don’t think the
Supreme Court’s free speech doctrines do much work. The[y] just set a tone—the thumb is
on the scale, favoring speech but not too much.”).
48
Posner, Pragmatism, supra note 40, at 748 n.33.
49
Id. at 743–44.
50
Id. at 743–44, 748.
51
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 26–33 (2006).
52
See Joshua P. Davis, Note, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 777, 809–10 (1993) (discussing Dworkin’s concept of fit).
53
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 140–240; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
(1986); Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 17 (1967).
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I. THE INHERENT STRUCTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW
A. Role of Government
1. Government Itself Acting
The first judgment in free speech cases is about the role of government. At the
most general level, that role can be defined in two ways: government itself can act, a
capacity we label as patron; or government can interfere with the conduct of private
citizens, which we call government as regulator.
Government as patron can be usefully subdivided. It can play the role of patron as
a speaker,54 a sponsor of speech,55 or a manager of an internal governmental function.56
Government speaks through public officials. An address by the President is an example.57 And government promotes messages by enlisting the assistance of private
individuals, at times offering incentives as part of that effort.58 Consider government
subsidies to medical professionals to provide information about medical services.59
Similarly, government as manager runs prisons, public schools, the United States
Postal Service, the military, and other institutions. In this role, it may impose various
restrictions on its employees so as to function effectively. So, for example, prison officials may allow certain groups access to prisoners to further the goals of the prison but
not permit similar access to other groups that will not promote—or may undermine—
those goals.60 Or school administrators may require teachers of mathematics to address
that subject during class hours, and not political issues.61
54

See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131–32 (2009) (noting government may itself speak); Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 38, at 183.
55
See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (noting government can control its message as
sponsor of speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991) (allowing government
to control content of message it sponsors); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
271 n.3 (1988) (noting government can exercise control over speech it sponsors).
56
See generally Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (2009) (recognizing government may control speech as part of an internal governmental operation); POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 4–6, 199–267 (discussing how government
may control speech in its managerial capacity).
57
See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 589 (2008) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has “shielded”
government speech from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause); Post, Subsidized Speech,
supra note 38, at 183.
58
See Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1384–85 (2001) (discussing propriety of government programs expressing a message).
59
Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93.
60
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 133–34 (1977) (allowing
prisons to choose which groups had access to prisoners depending on whether they served a
“rehabilitative” purpose).
61
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (noting schools have
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When government acts within its permissible role as patron, it is not subject to the
ordinary constraints of the Free Speech Clause. Government may promote one view
of a topic—that people should not take illegal drugs or that abstinence before marriage
is safe and wise—without providing support for an opposing perspective.62 The general prohibition on viewpoint discrimination—one of the central tenets of modern free
speech law63—does not apply.64
Much the same is true for government as manager. Schools may choose to teach
astronomy, but not astrology, even though that is a form of content discrimination.65
Or they may instruct students—and test them—on the year the Holocaust began, even
though citizens at large would be free to deny that it occurred.66
But that does not mean that the Free Speech Clause leaves government completely
unrestricted. To the contrary, courts police the outer boundary of government as
patron. So, for example, when government interferes with expression in a way that is
not justified by its role as manager, it acts as regulator. Along these lines, courts have
held that government in running a prison may restrict expression only in the service
of legitimate penological ends.67 Courts thus are called upon to confront forthrightly
what those legitimate ends are.
Other doctrines frame the same sort of judgment, although they are less transparent,
causing courts at times to lose sight of their purpose. An example is the public forum
doctrine.68 This doctrine can be understood as designed to draw the line between government as manager and regulator. If an airport imposes restrictions on solicitation
constitutional authority to control curriculum); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 685 (1986) (same).
62
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When
the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message,
it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted by the grantee.”).
63
See Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 15, at 50 (noting “the principle of
content neutrality has become the core of free speech analysis”); Amy Sabrin, Thinking About
Content: Can It Play An Appropriate Role in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE
L.J. 1209, 1220–21 (1993).
64
See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (allowing government to subsidize provision of information about family planning, and to prohibit communication about abortion);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (noting the Court in Rust allowed government to support one
viewpoint on abortion).
65
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (noting schools have constitutional authority to control
curriculum); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (same).
66
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685; Posner, Pragmatism, supra note 40, at 748.
67
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 133–34 (1977); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 1149; POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 199–267 (discussing managerial role of
government in various contexts).
68
See generally Post, Governance and Management, supra note 38; Post, Recuperating,
supra note 4, at 1270.
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of funds to prevent disruptions in administering air travel69—for example, attempting to minimize “pedestrian congestion,”70 “one of the greatest problems”71 in some
airports—that may well fall within government’s permissible role as manager. On
the other hand, a similar ban on the distribution of literature may go too far, constituting regulation because it lacks sufficient justification as part of government’s
managerial efforts.72
Courts, however, tend to obscure the crucial judgment in public forum cases,73
often focusing, for example, on purely historical practices to determine whether a
particular kind of government property qualifies as a public forum.74 A more direct
approach would be to assess the legitimate needs of the government in performing
an internal governmental function, however challenging that may be.75
A similar explanation applies to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. That
doctrine holds in relevant part that the government cannot condition receipt of a government benefit on relinquishing the right to freedom of speech.76 One such benefit
is receiving a salary for teaching at a public college.77 But this rule is too general to
resolve concrete cases. Government may impose some restrictions on the speech of
public college teachers—such as requiring them to address in class the subjects they
are hired to teach—but not others—such as prohibiting them from making political
speeches on their own time.78 And so a teacher states a claim when he alleges he was
fired for criticizing the Board of Regents, an action by government that may exceed its
legitimate role in running a state college system.79 If it does, government has strayed
into the role of regulator.
This line of analysis also holds the promise of explaining the apparently disjointed
decisions of the Supreme Court in the public school cases. These cases involve judicial
efforts to define the metes and bounds of government’s legitimate role as proprietor
of a public school. The sources of constraint on government in this and other settings
69

Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
Id. at 685.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 677 (affirming the court of appeals in allowing ban on solicitation in airport, but not
a similar ban on distribution of literature).
73
For criticism of the way in which courts fail to recognize the nature of the inquiry relevant to public forum cases, see generally Post, Governance and Management, supra note 38;
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 199–267, 199 & n.5.
74
Lee, 505 U.S. at 679–83. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 1143.
75
See generally POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 199–267; Post,
Governance and Management, supra note 38; see also Post, Recuperating, supra note 4,
at 1275.
76
See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
77
Id. at 595.
78
See, e.g., id. at 598 (“For this Court has held that a teacher’s public criticism of his
superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected.”); Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
79
Perry, 408 U.S. at 598.
70
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are at least twofold. First, government may define its mission in a way that limits the
restrictions it may impose on student speech. So, for example, a school may well be
permitted by the First Amendment to impose a dress code, but if it chooses not to do
so, it cannot permit students to wear some symbols—say, buttons from national campaigns or the Iron Cross, a symbol of Nazism80—but not allow them to don others—
including black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.81 When government deviates
from its own baseline for tolerating student expression in this way in effect it imposes
“a regulation”82 rather than merely managing a school.
But government in a public school or other setting is not entirely free in defining
its mission.83 Schools cannot, for example, remove books from a school library “in
a narrowly partisan or political manner,”84 based, for instance, on whether they are
“written by or in favor of Republicans” or “by blacks or advocating racial equality and
integration.”85 No matter how a school defines its mission, the Constitution places
limits on its ability to impose certain kinds of orthodox views.86 If government thus
exceeds its legitimate role in managing a school, it regulates.
To be sure, the line between the role of government as patron and regulator will
not always be obvious. Drawing it involves a contestable judgment. Our aim is to
explain the nature and significance of that judgment, not to suggest how it should be
resolved in any given case.
2. Recent Case Law
Judicial recognition of the role of government as patron has increased in recent
years, as has the leeway the Supreme Court gives government in that capacity. Caroline
Mala Corbin, for example, dates the Court’s current understanding of government
speech to its decision in Rust v. Sullivan in 1991.87
80

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969).
Id. at 513.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting
schools should not have free reign because some public officials “have defined their educational
missions as including the inculcation of whatever political and social views” they hold).
84
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870
(1982) (Brennan, J., plurality).
85
Id. at 871.
86
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409 (acknowledging a school cannot proscribe “political and
religious speech” because it is offensive); cf. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 599 n.3 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I suppose it would be unconstitutional for the
government to give money to an organization devoted to the promotion of candidates nominated by the Republican Party but it would be just as unconstitutional for the government
itself to promote candidates nominated by the Republican Party, and I do not think that that
unconstitutionality has anything to do with the First Amendment.”).
87
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008).
81
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Indeed, permitting government great latitude to interfere with expression as
patron has been a major theme of the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Consider its recent decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.88 It held that
“the placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form
of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause.”89 Summum provides perhaps the clearest articulation to date of the Court’s
view of government as speaker or sponsor of speech: “The Free Speech Clause restricts
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. A
government entity has a right to ‘speak for itself.’ [I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,
and to select the views that it wants to express.”90
The Roberts Court has been somewhat less clear—but similarly expansive—in
permitting government to interfere with expression as manager.91 So, for example, in
Morse v. Frederick it held that an Alaskan public school could restrict student expression that officials “reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”92 To be sure, the
Court acknowledged that schools cannot punish speech for being political or religious.93
But even though the student speech at issue arguably was both—the student had displayed a banner on a public sidewalk reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” a message with
elements of religion (it mentioned Jesus) and politics (the legalization of marijuana
had been a hot topic in Alaska)94—the Justices deferred to school officials and held
they did not violate the First Amendment in punishing the student.95
Similarly, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,96 the Court held that a district attorney’s office
did not violate the First Amendment when it disciplined a deputy district attorney for
writing a memorandum (and engaging in other expression) pursuant to his official
duties.97 Indeed, the Court went so far as to rule that any expression that is part of a
government employee’s job duties is subject to government control.98
88

129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
Id. at 1129.
90
Id. at 1131 (citations omitted).
91
For the Court’s most recent recognition of the point see Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on
an interest in allowing government entities to perform their functions.” (citations omitted)).
92
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007).
93
Id. at 409.
94
Id. at 445 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95
Id. at 408. For this reason we believe Frederick Schauer overstates when he claims the
Supreme Court generally has been indifferent to institutional context in free speech cases. See
Schauer, Institutional, supra note 2, at 1263. In regard to the role of government, institutional
context has often mattered a great deal. Schauer’s point has greater force as applied to the
second and third judgments in our framework.
96
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
97
Id. at 419.
98
Id. at 421.
89
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This rule shows a great deal of deference to government as manager.99 Not all
speech in which government employees engage as part of their duties would hinder a
legitimate governmental function. For this reason, Justice Breyer, in dissent, quarreled
with the categorical conclusion that when an employee communicates as part of her
official responsibilities—even on matters of public concern—she would necessarily
cause the kind of disruption that warrants government suppression.100
In this way, Justice Breyer’s position is arguably consistent with the traditional
rule authorizing courts to weigh the value of speech against the harm it may cause to
legitimate governmental activity.101 Garcetti appears to leave no room for that sort
of balancing. According to the majority in Garcetti, the only issue was the kind of
task government was performing, not whether speech would cause sufficient disruption to justify its restriction.102 Justice Breyer challenged this notion. But he agreed
with the general proposition that government may prevent its employees from speaking in a way that would “unduly interfere with legitimate governmental interests, such
as the interest in efficient administration.”103
Most recently, in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association,104 the Court held that
Idaho did not violate the First Amendment by banning payroll deductions from local
government employees for use in union political activities.105 In so ruling, the Court
reasoned that Idaho was not attempting to suppress ideas with which it disagreed, but
rather sought to avoid the “reality or appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics.”106 In other words, according to the Court, Idaho was exercising control over its internal functions and separating them from any private speech
in which local public employees might engage. As the Court put the matter, “Banning
payroll deductions for political speech . . . furthers the government’s interest in distinguishing between internal governmental operations and private speech.”107
In each of these cases, the Court held that government had not exceeded its role as
patron by interfering with speech because it was managing an internal governmental
function. Of course, this conclusion involves an exercise of judgment. In Ysursa,
99

We believe the best way to characterize the government’s role in Garcetti is as manager
of an employee, even though the employee would speak on behalf of the government vis-à-vis
the general public.
100
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446.
101
See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (balancing free speech rights of
individuals, including based on its importance to matters of public concern, against the need of
government as employer to provide public services in an efficient manner); Pickering v. Bd.
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (same).
102
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25.
103
Id. at 445.
104
129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009).
105
Id. at 1096.
106
Id. at 1098.
107
Id. at 1099.
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for example, Justice Stevens made a strong case in dissent that the relevant Idaho
statute was designed to frustrate union efforts to finance political speech.108
But our point is not to defend all—or any—of the Supreme Court’s many recent
decisions that turn on the role of government. It is merely to frame the relevant judgment and to recognize its significance. The judgment is about whether government
acts as patron or regulator. The line between the two is demarcated in part by how
government defines its own role and in part by the Constitution. The significance
of the judgment is that the Free Speech Clause constrains government in its role as
regulator but not as patron.
3. The Kind of Deprivation that Implicates the Constitution
The role of government addresses a preliminary requirement for the Constitution
to apply. The Constitution does not empower every citizen to object to every government action. A citizen must show that the government caused her to suffer the relevant
kind of harm.109 Characterizing the role of government is a way to address this issue.
Consider first when government speaks or sponsors speech. It is not clear that
government causes any particular citizen to suffer harm as a result, even if government engages in viewpoint discrimination. Constitutional jurisprudence deals with
this problem in various ways, including through the ban on lawsuits based on generalized grievances.110 This framing can explain the Court’s conclusion that government
is free to say what it likes, including through private citizens who willingly agree to
express the government’s message. Recall the Court’s statement in Summum: “The
Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. A government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself.’ [I]t
is entitled to say what it wishes, and to select the views that it wants to express.”111
108

Id. at 1104–08. See also infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 91.
110
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 90–98. Individuals generally are not allowed to bring
a claim against the government as either a citizen or taxpayer looking to encourage the government to follow the law. Plaintiffs are required to show that they personally have suffered a
concrete injury. Id.
111
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131(2009) (citations omitted). The
Court continued:
Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it
lacked this freedom. “If every citizen were to have a right to insist that
no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those
in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it would
be radically transformed.” A government entity may exercise this same
freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from private
sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.
Id. (paragraph separations and citations omitted); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (noting that in Rust v. Sullivan “the government did
109
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A variation on the same analysis applies to government as manager. To some
extent private citizens cede their rights as a result of institutional context, including
the right to say whatever they wish.112 That understanding can explain the Court’s
pronouncement in Garcetti: “We hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.”113
None of this means that the Free Speech Clause can never restrain government
when it purports to act as speaker, sponsor, or manager.114 Regarding government as
sponsor, for example, Justice Scalia concurring in Finley acknowledged that one might
conclude denial of government subsidies in some circumstances amounts to coercion
and therefore treat it as government regulating.115 Similarly, government as manager
of a school, a prison, or a district attorney’s office can go too far, interfering with the
speech of students,116 prisoners,117 or employees118 as private citizens. However, when
government remains within its legitimate role of patron, it does not harm citizens in
a way that gives rise to a constitutional claim.
B. Target of Government Regulation
1. Regulation of Speech or Conduct
The second judgment in our framework is about the target of government regulation. Put simply, our claim is that the Free Speech Clause protects citizens only
against government’s intentional interference with speech, not conduct.
But this statement is imprecise. The protection applies not merely to speech, but
also to other forms of communication. And all communication requires conduct, and
all conduct is potentially communicative. We might put the same point in somewhat
more exact terms, if more clumsily, by saying the Free Speech Clause applies if government targets an expressive attribute of conduct, but not if it targets a non-expressive
attribute of conduct. For simplicity, we will at times refer to the distinction between
government targeting conduct and speech (or expression or communication).
not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program”).
112
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom [of speech].”).
113
Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
114
See infra note 121.
115
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 596 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“One might contend, I suppose, that a threat of rejection by the only
available source of free money would constitute coercion and hence ‘abridgement’ within the
meaning of the First Amendment.”).
116
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
117
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415–16 (1989) (acknowledging this possibility).
118
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595–97 (1972).
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A final preliminary note is in order. To make our argument, we need not resolve
the thorny issue of how to distinguish conduct from speech.119 Our claim is about the
importance of that distinction, however courts draw it.
2. Doctrines and Examples
It is often easy to determine whether the purpose of government action is to regulate speech. In some cases, government regulation is obviously unrelated to expression.
A ban on burglary is an example. Burglary can be part of an effort at communication—
as can any act—but government prohibits burglary to preserve property rights, to prevent violence, and the like.120 Its goal is not to suppress speech. Laws of this nature
pose no difficulty under the First Amendment. They are constitutional.
At other times, it is similarly obvious that government intends to regulate speech.
Consider a law imposing criminal penalties for criticizing the President. The manifest
goal of this law is to silence communication. The strictures of the Free Speech Clause
therefore apply.121
Matters become trickier in two situations where the target of government regulation is ambiguous. To put the matter crudely, these occur when government appears
to regulate conduct but may really regulate expression and when it appears to regulate
expression but may really regulate conduct. A somewhat more precise formulation
of the same point is that courts struggle when government regulates conduct that is
not ordinarily expressive, but it may be doing so because of the message the conduct
expresses, and conversely, when it regulates conduct that is ordinarily expressive, but
may be doing so for reasons unrelated to the message the conduct expresses.122
As to government appearing to regulate conduct but really regulating expression,
consider a law proscribing flag burning. Setting an object on fire is conduct. And a
general ban on conflagrations would not implicate the First Amendment. But the ban
on flag burning is aimed at the message that the conduct expresses. The Free Speech
119

See, e.g., Greenman, supra note 4, at 1340 (attempting to define communication as a
key concept for purposes of the First Amendment).
120
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (“The traditional police
power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and
morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation.”); cf. id. at 577 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Free Speech Clause nevertheless applies to conduct “[w]here the
government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes”) (emphasis
omitted); see also Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1252; Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note
30, at 776–78.
121
The First Amendment is also implicated by a law of general applicability that regulates
expression based on its content. An example is a ban on racial discrimination in the workplace,
which could involve conduct—e.g., deciding not to promote a worker because of her race—or
speech—e.g., making comments in the workplace that create a hostile work environment. See
Volokh, supra note 26, at 1281–82.
122
See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Clause therefore applies.123 Case law has developed for dealing with laws restricting
this kind of expressive or symbolic conduct. Justice Scalia, concurring in Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., a case involving nude dancing, recognized this half of the equation, noting the First Amendment applies “[w]here the government prohibits conduct
precisely because of its communicative attributes . . . .”124
The second situation—one that is the other side of the same coin—involves
government appearing to interfere with expression, but really addressing conduct. A
law that prevents a person from stopping in a crosswalk and disrupting the flow of
pedestrian traffic would fall into this category.125 Assume the police invoke this law
in issuing a ticket to someone who pauses while crossing the street to give a lengthy
political speech. The law is designed for convenience and safety. Of course, in this
particular instance in restraining conduct, government impedes speech. But communication is not in the government’s sights.126 The Free Speech Clause therefore permits this government regulation. More generally, we submit that the time, place, and
manner doctrine addresses this situation.127 The classic example is a ban on sound
trucks because of the noise they produce.128 In this sense, the Court is correct to point
out the similarities between the doctrines that pertain to symbolic conduct and to time,
place or manner restrictions, serving, as they do, the common goal of determining the
target of government regulation.129
123

United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315–17 (1990) (holding that ban on flag burning is related to the message the act expresses); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–07
(1989) (noting that flag burning is expressive and that expression was the target of
government regulation).
124
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 577. We nevertheless disagree in part with Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Barnes. Most notably, merely because government targets communication does not
necessarily mean it violates the Constitution, as he asserts. Id. It means only that courts will
subject government action to scrutiny.
125
See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (“[A] person could not exercise this
liberty [under the First Amendment] by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street,
contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic . . . .”).
126
Of course, the analysis would be different if police used the law selectively, enforcing
it in response to the content of the message expressed. Cf. Dorf, supra note 6, at 1208–09 (suggesting courts are concerned with incidental burdens on speech in the context of public forums).
127
Note that while the thrust of the doctrine is to identify the target of government regulation, it can also be used to address the third judgment in our framework, a constrained costbenefit analysis. But fully disentangling its elements and mapping them onto our framework
is beyond the scope of this Article.
128
See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993); Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 793 (1989); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 113 (1980) (discussing “sound trucks” and the
distinction between speech and conduct).
129
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (“[W]e have held that the O’Brien test [for symbolic conduct]
‘in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984))).
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Another important point pertains to supposed judicial scrutiny of incidental burdens
on expression. If we are correct, government action that has an unintended impact on
speech does not violate the Free Speech Clause. Yet courts sometimes claim the contrary.130 What, then, are we to make of this line of precedent?
Our answer is that courts in deciding the relevant cases—and formulating the relevant doctrines—are really concerned about the target of government regulation. This
is true in two senses. First, the key cases tend to involve government restrictions on
forms of expression, including Schneider v. State,131 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,132 and City of Ladue v. Gilleo.133 So, for example, Schneider addressed a ban on the distribution of leaflets,134 Minneapolis Star a
tax on materials used in publication,135 and City of Ladue a prohibition on residential
signs.136 Leaflets, publications, and signs are by their nature expressive.137 The government actions at issue, then, applied to the conduct because of an expressive attribute.138
Moreover, to the extent government offered a justification for its actions that was
unrelated to expression, the courts had reason to suspect pretext.139 Citing incidental
effects may have just been a way for courts to avoid saying that they were secondguessing government’s motive, which can be an uncomfortable task.140
This understanding can explain two anomalies regarding the supposed protection
against incidental burdens on expression. First, the protection is anemic. Commentators have had difficulty explaining why courts so rarely strike down government
action that has an incidental burden on expression.141
The second anomaly is that courts often say they would permit a greater but not a
lesser incidental impact on expression—for example, in Schneider a strict ban on trespassing generally, but not one that addresses trespassing only to distribute leaflets142
and in Minneapolis Star, a tax on all businesses, but not a tax only on ink and paper
130

See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983).
131
308 U.S. 147, 148 (1939).
132
460 U.S. 575, 577 (1983).
133
512 U.S. 43, 45 (1994).
134
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 148.
135
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 577.
136
Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 45.
137
See Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 831 (making a point along these lines).
138
See Volokh, supra note 26, at 1284 (defining law as regulating expression if it applies
based on its content).
139
See Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 786.
140
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (denying
courts should question government motive); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
(1968) (same).
141
See, e.g., Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1264; Dorf, supra note 6, at 1204
(characterizing the O’Brien test as addressing incidental burdens on expression and noting
it “asks so little in principle, it should not be surprising that it means so little in practice”).
142
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163–64 (1939).
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used in publications.143 As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent in Minneapolis
Star, government could place a far greater burden—and suppress more expression—
by imposing a high general tax than a low special tax that applies only to newspapers.144
But that point misses the crux of the majority’s reasoning: “[D]ifferential treatment,
unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the
regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression.”145
Indeed, both anomalies disappear if we recognize that cases and doctrines that purport to deal with incidental burdens on expression are actually concerned with pretext.
Since many general laws that burden expression do so unintentionally, it is unsurprising
that the protection against these laws appears weak. And since unintentional suppression may have a far greater impact than intentional suppression of speech, it is similarly unsurprising that courts allow greater but not lesser restrictions on expression.
3. Does the Free Speech Clause Apply?
Attention to the target of regulation can be understood as a way of defining the
scope of the Free Speech Clause. That clause is not a general constraint on government action. It protects only speech.146 Of course, defining speech is not easy. And
speech may include more than verbal communication.147 Other expressive conduct
counts, too. Still, the Free Speech Clause is limited.
To be sure, courts could reasonably invoke the First Amendment to strike down
incidental burdens on expression. But they have to define the scope of free speech
in some way.148 Our argument is that as a matter of rationalizing case law—that is,
based on experience, not logic—the most plausible view is that courts have applied the
Clause only when government targets expression.
C. A Constrained Cost-Benefit Analysis
The third judgment in our framework is about the costs and benefits of suppressing
speech. But it does not necessarily involve balancing on a purely case by case basis.
Courts have determined that some justifications for restricting speech are impermissible—or at least disfavored—while other justifications may generally suffice, at least
143

Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co., v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
Id. at 601–02 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
145
Id. at 585.
146
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (“The First Amendment literally forbids the
abridgement only of ‘speech.’”).
147
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315–17 (1990) (flag burning as expression);
Texas, 491 U.S. at 406–07 (same).
148
See Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1250–60 (discussing doctrine pertaining to
“symbolic conduct” as relevant to whether the First Amendment applies to government regulation); Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 761 (same).
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under certain conditions.149 For these reasons, we characterize the third judgment as
a constrained cost-benefit analysis.150
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis
To some extent, courts acknowledge that they are willing to sacrifice expression
to various governmental interests. But they tend to treat these cases as minor exceptions.151 In reality, the permissible justifications for silencing speech are many, and
the absolute constraints on those justifications few.152
a. Acknowledged Sacrifices of Speech
Sometimes courts declare that the government may privilege other concerns over
expression. Examples are: true threats;153 fighting words;154 and incitement.155 In
these instances, government may restrict speech to protect the relevant governmental
interests. A particularly clear instance of balancing involves obscenity. According to
the Supreme Court, expression is obscene only if it appeals to the prurient interest of
the average person, is patently offensive, and lacks serious redeeming artistic, literary, political, or scientific value.156 Here, we see doctrine attending to both costs and
benefits: suppressing speech must entail low costs—the speech lacks any redeeming
value—and high benefits—preventing significant offense.
b. Unacknowledged Sacrifices of Speech
i. Secondary Effects
At other times, courts are less straightforward about their balancing. Consider
the secondary effects test. Courts often frame the test as identifying laws that do
not threaten speech.157 According to this view, if government seeks to address the
149

ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL ET AL., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 84–85 (2004).
The constraints involve a form of “categoricalism” familiar to First Amendment jurisprudence. See generally Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009).
151
See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 596 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
152
See, e.g., Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 32 (arguing that many forms of communication receive no protection from the First Amendment).
153
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
154
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
155
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 999 (discussing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969)).
156
Id. at 1020.
157
See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986).
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secondary effects of speech—as opposed to its primary effects—its actions are “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”158 So, for example, the Supreme Court
in City of Renton upheld a zoning ordinance applicable to adult movie theatres—and
treated the ordinance as “content-neutral”—because it was designed “to prevent crime,
protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and
preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, [and] commercial districts’” not
to suppress the expression of unpopular views.159 In other words, the city was concerned with the indirect, not the direct, effects of expression. But this will not do.
Speech is routinely protected from laws concerned with its indirect effects.
Indeed, this is the point of the narrow framing of incitement doctrine, which, under
Brandenburg v. Ohio, allows government to punish speech only if it threatens imminent harm.160 Ordinarily, the harm at issue in the incitement doctrine stems from its
secondary effects.161 Government is not concerned with direct harms from the speech
itself, but rather with the consequences of others reacting to it.162 This secondary
effects doctrine suggests courts should allow government to interfere with expression
that may lead to lawless behavior.
But, of course, incitement doctrine does not work that way. It does not because
courts do not generally allow government to target expression because of its indirect
consequences.163 Courts would not permit a city to confine political activity to a narrow
area, even if the city could show, for example, that a bookstore selling propaganda and
leading discussion groups critical of the government had undesirable consequences—
even if it increased the crime rate, undermined the city’s retail trade, decreased property values, or compromised the quality of the city’s neighborhoods and commercial
districts, whatever that means.164
In reality, the content of speech matters for purposes of the secondary effects test.
Sexually oriented speech is treated as low value and given less protection than, say,
political speech.165 In other words, the Supreme Court in Renton used the secondary
effects test as a way to mask its balancing of the costs and benefits of restricting
expression.166 The harm from suppression of sexually oriented speech was not as
158

Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
Id.
160
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
161
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 999.
162
Id. at 1000.
163
See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 293
(2009) (“[W]hen political speech is concerned, the secondary effects doctrine has no rational
place in First Amendment law. The good news, however, is that courts generally do not apply
the secondary effects doctrine to most forms of protected speech.”).
164
Id.; Posner, Pragmatism, supra note 40, at 742; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2009) (noting special protection afforded political speech).
165
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 1025–30; Posner, Pragmatism, supra note 40, at 741–42.
166
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986).
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great, in the eyes of the Court, as similarly restricting establishments that engage in
political expression.167
ii. Speech as Conduct
Another example is judicial treatment of speech as conduct. Eugene Volokh has
usefully divided this issue into four categories: speech that runs afoul of generally
applicable laws based on the content of the message expressed;168 speech used as part
of an illegal course of action;169 “situation-altering utterances;”170 and a grab bag of
doctrines including “aiding and abetting, criminal solicitation, conspiracy, perjury,
agreements to restrain trade, and professional advice to clients.”171 He successfully
casts doubt on whether any of these categories should be treated as non-speech, as
opposed to speech that government may regulate under appropriate circumstances.172
Volokh’s argument covers a great deal of ground, but his overarching point is that
characterizing speech as conduct is generally conclusory, providing a label for when
speech rights lose to other interests rather than a reason not to protect speech.173 Take,
for example, the notion that speech should be treated as conduct when the message expressed has effects that violate a generally applicable law.174 Under this approach, a
philosophical argument that our government should be overthrown—if sufficiently influential—might be subject to punishment in much the same way as building bombs.175
Or praise of people who blockade or vandalize establishments that provide abortion
services—again, depending on its consequences—might be subject to sanction just as
would the blockading or vandalizing itself.176 Yet we generally think this sort of communication is protected by the First Amendment.177
Of course, sometimes speech causes harms that are so certain and immediate that
we allow government to suppress it, as permitted by the Brandenburg test.178 But the
more straightforward way to proceed is to acknowledge that we are suppressing speech,
and to explain why we are doing so, rather than pretending that speech has somehow
morphed into conduct because of the consequences of the message it expresses.
The secondary effects test and speech treated as conduct are but two among many
examples. Courts allow government to restrict expression in a host of situations:
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

See generally id.
Volokh, supra note 26, at 1281.
Id. at 1282–83.
Id. at 1283–84.
Id. at 1284.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 1286–87.
Id. at 1288–89.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1289–90.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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contract, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, fraud, requirements for publicly traded securities (including forced disclosures), commercial speech, trademark, copyright, patent,
the right to publicity, the right to privacy, sexual and racial harassment, nude dancing, defamation, malpractice, restrictions on who may provide professional advice to
clients (including medical or legal), and so on.179 Some of these contexts might be
appropriately treated as involving speech that is tantamount to conduct, although, as
we have seen, that categorization may just be a way to beg the difficult questions. But
cumulatively it is clear that we permit government to restrict expression for a great
many reasons in a great many situations. A cost-benefit analysis lurks behind many
of them.
2. Constraints
Acknowledging that courts at times weigh the costs and benefits of silencing
speech is not the same as claiming that judges may always engage in unstructured balancing. Various justifications for restricting expression may be impermissible—or at
least disfavored—while others may be favored.
a. Incitement
Consider incitement. As noted above, Brandenburg v. Ohio holds that government
may punish advocacy of illegal conduct provided several requirements are met: imminent harm; a likelihood of producing illegal action; and an intent to cause imminent
illegality.180 These requirements do not correlate to an ordinary cost-benefit analysis,
which would, for example, focus on the magnitude of harm rather than its imminence.181 Taken literally, Brandenburg does not allow punishment of speech if the
harms it is likely to cause are delayed but very large, but it does allow punishment if
the harms are immediate and relatively minor.182
The cost-benefit analysis under incitement, then, may be constrained. Justifications
under incitement for great harms only in the future may be impermissible183 (or at least
disfavored—would courts really strike down government suppression of expression
that would be certain to result in a nuclear explosion months or years in the future?).
Other justifications may be favored, such as when relatively minor harms will occur
with great certainty and no lapse of time. The reason is not obvious for focusing judges
on the imminence rather than on the magnitude of harm. A possibility is that delayed
harm is by its nature speculative.184 We may not trust government actors, including
179

See generally Schauer, Institutional, supra note 2; Volokh, supra note 26.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 999.
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ELY, supra note 128, at 108; POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 40, at 65; Rubenfeld,
Purpose, supra note 30, at 829.
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ELY, supra note 128, at 108.
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POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 40, at 65; Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 829.
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Justice Brandeis implied as much in his famous concurrence in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (“[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
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judges, to suppress speech on such a basis. In any case, the key points are that courts
engage in cost-benefit analysis but that they sometimes do so within a formal structure.
b. Plausible, if Not Absolute, Constraints
The restrictions on cost-benefit analysis in free speech cases are not entirely clear,
and they may give way at times. Justice Holmes dissenting in Gitlow recognized what
would seem to be a bedrock principle of free speech law—that government cannot
suppress expression because it may prove persuasive and cause the nation to choose
an unwise course.185 Cass Sunstein suggests four forbidden motivations for silencing
speech: first, government’s disagreement with the ideas expressed; second, its perception of the “government’s (as opposed to the public’s) self-interest;” third, “its fear that
people will be persuaded or influenced by ideas;” and, fourth, to prevent offense from
the ideas expressed.186
These constraints are plausible, but they do not seem to be absolute. Sunstein’s
third point—that government cannot ban speech for fear it will prove persuasive187—
is similar to the one Holmes made in Gitlow188—and, again, Holmes was dissenting.
It is difficult to reconcile with the result the Court reached in cases involving antiwar
speech during World War I—including Schenck v. United States,189 Frohwerk v.
United States,190 Debs v. United States,191 and Abrams v. United States.192 Of course,
these decisions may no longer be good law.193 But, as Judge Richard Posner has
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there
is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”).
185
See Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted
by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should
be given their chance and have their way.”).
186
CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 155 (1995); see
also Kagan, supra note 1, at 435 (arguing government cannot restrict expression based on
“ideological motives”).
187
See also Volokh, supra note 26, at 1304 (“[T]he premise of modern First Amendment
law is that the government generally may not (with a few narrow exceptions) punish speech
because of a fear, even a justified fear, that people will make the wrong decisions based on
that speech.”).
188
See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of
the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and
have their way.”).
189
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
190
249 U.S. 204 (1919).
191
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
192
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
193
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 988 (“The reasonableness test is the one approach
that has been expressly repudiated by later Court decisions.”); Volokh, supra note 26, at 1287
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noted—citing United States v. Dennis194—if Cold War hysteria caused the courts to
cut back on free speech rights, perhaps such decisions reflect a realistic view of the
scope of those rights when the nation is in the grip of fear.195
Similarly, Sunstein’s fourth claim—regarding mere “offense”—meets resistance,
for example, from government’s ability to restrict nude dancing196 and to zone establishments that host sexually oriented expression.197 Perhaps these decisions can be
limited to nudity and sexually explicit movies because they are not expressive of ideas
in the same way as verbal communication, but drawing such a distinction is no mean
feat.198 A great deal of art—including music, painting, and poetry, not just pornography—might be at risk if we were to distinguish, say, between expression that appeals
to us in a cerebral way and expression that appeals in a visceral way, and if we were
to protect only the former.199
But, of course, cost-benefit analysis may be constrained, even if some justifications
for restricting expression are merely disfavored, not impermissible.200 And it is safe
to say that courts are deeply skeptical of government restrictions on expression when
they are justified in the ways Sunstein identifies.201
c. Secondary Effects Revisited
These constraints can make sense of the secondary effects doctrine, at least in a
reconstituted form. As noted above, courts at times treat the secondary effects doctrine
as if it identifies innocuous government action, innocuous because it to does not target expression in a way that implicates the First Amendment.202 But it does. The Free
Speech Clause generally applies to expression that is regulated because of the indirect
harms it may cause.203
(“These cases, which upheld the criminal punishment of antiwar speech, are now generally
seen as wrongly decided.”).
194
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
195
See POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 40, at 72 (“[T]he economist is neither surprised
by nor necessarily critical of the fact that freedom of speech has not always and everywhere
been understood as capaciously as it is today in this country.”).
196
See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
197
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
198
Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1099 (1990) (“If the line between the
expressive and the nonexpressive is indistinct, the ‘line’ between speech and conduct, between
live performances and performances on paper, videotape, or compact disc, is a blur.”); see also
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592–93 (“The nudity element of nude dancing performances cannot be neatly
pigeonholed as mere ‘conduct’ independent of any expressive component of the dance.”).
199
Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 779.
200
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 8 (1982).
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SUNSTEIN, supra note 186, at 155.
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See supra notes 10–11, 157–59 and accompanying text.
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Fee, supra note 163, at 293.
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But the secondary effects test can be useful in a different way. Rather than identifying justifications for restricting expression that are perfectly benign it can be understood as identifying those that are categorically unacceptable (or at least disfavored).
Robert Post suggests that the Court has categorized as primary, not secondary, those
“effects caused by speech through persuasion or ideas, through the provision of information, or through the creation of offense.”204 This list looks a lot like some of
Sunstein’s prohibited justifications.205 When government regulates speech because
of its primary effects, then, we might conclude that its doing so is (virtually) automatically unconstitutional. When it comes to secondary effects, in contrast, courts may
engage in balancing, allowing, for example, the restriction of sexual speech because
of a perception of its low value.
3. Constrained Cost-Benefit Analysis: Application of the Free Speech Clause
The constrained cost-benefit analysis we have discussed is a way to determine
whether expression or competing governmental interests will prevail in any given
case. In making this determination, courts sometimes invoke a particular doctrine,
such as the test for incitement under Brandenburg. At other times, courts apply a tier
of scrutiny, often strict scrutiny.206 In any case, our argument is about how courts apply
the Free Speech Clause—they weigh the costs and benefits of suppressing expression,
although they do so subject to constraints.
D. Content Discrimination
The framework we propose holds the potential to solve various free speech riddles.
One of them is the relevance of content discrimination. Applying our framework to
case law reveals how each of the three judgments is necessary to explain the full pattern
of judicial decisions in this area of free speech law.
Judicial attention to content discrimination plays a crucial part in free speech cases.
Professor Chemerinsky goes so far as to suggest that “the principle of content neutrality
has become the core of free speech analysis.”207
But the significance of content discrimination is difficult to explain. Courts often
express skepticism when government discriminates based on the content of expression in general and based on its point of view in particular. So, for example, in Police
204

Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1267.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 186, at 155.
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Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2442 (1996) (discussing application of strict scrutiny).
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Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 15, at 50; see also Schauer, Institutional,
supra note 2, at 1270 (noting that “conflation of the morally and politically divergent in the
service of avoiding content-based or viewpoint-based distinctions explains much of the unalterable core of the First Amendment”).
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Department of Chicago v. Mosley the Supreme Court famously declared that, “above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”208 R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul similarly held that even so-called unprotected speech—in that case,
fighting words—cannot be punished based on the perspective it expresses.209
At other times, however, courts have upheld various government actions that
engage in subject matter or even viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court, for
example, permitted a school principal to punish a student for displaying a banner that
could reasonably be construed as encouraging drug use,210 though the principal would
not have punished student expression discouraging drug use.211 Similarly, the Court
upheld a law proscribing the burning of crosses as a true threat,212 though it admitted
the “indelible” association between that act and the Ku Klux Klan.213
In these and similar cases, courts either appear to stray from the rules that they have
articulated for dealing with content discrimination or they torture the ordinary use of
language, denying that discrimination based on content is content discrimination214 or
that discrimination based on viewpoint is viewpoint discrimination.215 Scholars have
struggled in vain for a single principle that can render the Court’s decisions coherent.216
We believe they have failed because there is no such single principle.
Instead of embodying one principle, at various times courts enlist content discrimination for any of three purposes: (1) to define the role of government; (2) to identify
the target of government regulation; or (3) to smoke out impermissible (or disfavored)
motivations for restricting expression. In other words, judicial attention to content discrimination can assist in each of the judgments in our framework.
1. Role of Government
Government does not always violate the Constitution when it engages in content
discrimination. Far from it. Government as speaker may take a controversial position,
208
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See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 15, at 55–56, 64 (arguing
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as if it were content neutral).
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Id. (arguing Supreme Court at times interprets viewpoint discrimination so narrowly
that it allows government to discriminate by point of view).
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See, e.g., id. at 55–56 (arguing that principle of content neutrality serves value of
equality). But see id. at 64 (arguing numerous Supreme Court decisions have “compromised,
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as when the President makes a policy speech.217 The same is true for government as
sponsor, whether it subsidizes advice about family planning only if it does not address
abortion218 or provides a place in a public park for a monument that represents a
particular perspective.219 And government as manager may take sides on an issue,
rewarding students only if they acknowledge the Holocaust (or World War II or the
Enlightenment) but not if they do not.220
However, that does not mean content and viewpoint discrimination have no relevance to the inquiry into government role. Such discrimination can sometimes assist
in identifying the capacity in which government acts. The school cases provide an
example. Courts have held that schools may impose dress codes without violating the
First Amendment.221 But that does not mean school officials have unfettered discretion in this regard. Courts may balk at content or viewpoint discrimination regarding
clothing if it does not serve a legitimate pedagogical function.222
This occurred in Tinker.223 A school had banned black armbands protesting the
Vietnam War but not campaign buttons or Iron Crosses.224 Discrimination based on
content in this setting suggested the school was imposing a political orthodoxy that
did not fall within its permissible role as proprietor of a school. In other words, as
the Court explained, the ban was akin to “a regulation . . . forbidding discussion of
the Vietnam conflict, or the expression of any student of opposition to it anywhere on
school property except as part of a prescribed classroom exercise . . . .”225 As a result,
the Court scrutinized the school’s actions under the Free Speech Clause.
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Ysursa pursued a similar line of analysis. He claimed
that for various reasons the ban on payroll deductions for the political activities of
unions was designed to hinder their particular point of view: it was part of a package
217

See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 589 (2008) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has “shielded”
government speech from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause); Post, Subsidized Speech,
supra note 38, at 183.
218
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991).
219
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
220
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1987) (noting schools have
constitutional authority to control curriculum); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 685 (1986) (same). The Court has come closest to recognizing this point in its recent
decision in Citizens United. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899
(2010) (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the
disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing
governmental entities to perform their functions.” (citations omitted)).
221
See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 441–42 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding public school imposition of mandatory dress policy).
222
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 504.
225
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
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of legislation targeting unions;226 as originally enacted it was overbroad, applying
to both private and public employers;227 it did not restrict deductions for charitable
activities, which might give rise to a similar appearance of taking sides on political
issues;228 and it may have affected only unions, not other entities.229 Stevens thus relied on content discrimination to suggest that Idaho was not pursuing the legitimate
governmental function of avoiding entanglement in partisan politics but instead had
strayed into a regulatory role by taking sides in partisan politics.
Similarly, in Thornburgh v. Abbott, the Supreme Court addressed various restrictions on the publications federal prisoners may receive.230 The regulatory regime at
issue allowed the warden to censor publications because they might have undermined
the “security, good order, or discipline of the [prison]”231 but not because their
content was “religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual or . . . unpopular or
repugnant.”232 The Court ultimately held that the government action was constitutional so long as it was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”233
In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on an odd interpretation of content
discrimination. The Court acknowledged that the regulations required the warden to
assess the content of publications, but it nonetheless labeled the regulations as content
“neutral” to the extent they required him to determine only whether the publications
posed a threat to security at the prison.234
Commentators have understandably questioned the Court’s reasoning in Thornburgh.235 The Court strained to characterize content discrimination as somehow content neutral. But the reasoning of the Court—if not its use of language—makes sense
once situated within the first judgment in our framework. The Court used content
neutrality as a way to describe actions by the warden that remained within his legitimate
role as manager of a prison. In contrast, had the warden banned all political publications, or all publications criticizing the government, he would have engaged in content
or viewpoint discrimination in the relevant sense. In this and other cases, attention to
content discrimination can be understood as a way of distinguishing government as
patron from government as regulator.236
226

Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1105 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
228
Id. at 1106.
229
Id. at 1106 n.2.
230
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 402 (1989).
231
Id. at 404.
232
Id. at 405.
233
Id. at 404 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
234
Id. at 415–16.
235
See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 26, at 1303 n.126.
236
The same point could be made with any number of additional examples. Professor
Chemerinsky, for example, notes instances in which the Supreme Court has treated discrimination by viewpoint as not viewpoint discriminatory: in Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), in allowing a public television station to deny a third party
227
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2. Government’s Purpose
The second judgment in our framework explains another use courts make of
attention to content discrimination: identifying the target of government regulation.
Consider City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.237 Cincinnati prohibited news
racks that dispense handbills, but not newspapers.238 The city claimed it was concerned
only about safety and aesthetics—that a surfeit of news racks posed a physical danger
to its citizens and detracted from its appearance.239 The city’s argument in effect was
that it was targeting conduct, not expression.240 The Court rejected this contention,
labeling the regulation “content based”241 because it distinguished between news racks
based on the content of the publications they displayed.242
This conclusion is understandable. It is plausible that the city gave preferential
treatment to newspapers as compared to handbills in part as a result of the different
messages the publications communicated. Content discrimination, then, can offer a
crucial clue about whether expression is the target of government regulation. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine an example of government discriminating by content but not
targeting expression.
3. Constrained Cost-Benefit Analysis
The constraints on cost-benefit analysis can explain a third use courts make of
content and viewpoint discrimination. At times such discrimination reveals that
government is acting on an impermissible (or disfavored) basis.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul provides an illustration. The Supreme Court held that
even unprotected speech could not be regulated on the basis of viewpoint.243 At issue
was an ordinance in St. Paul, Minnesota that prohibited the use of fighting words—
including burning crosses and Nazi swastikas—that arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”244
candidate participation in a debate for a congressional seat and in Nat’l Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), in allowing the National Endowment for the Arts to
consider “standards of decency” in awarding grants. Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra
note 15, at 56–59. Both opinions can be explained as the Court concluding government acted
within its permissible role as patron, whether overseeing a political debate or subsidizing the
arts. Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Finley distinguished “Government
[ ] acting as patron rather than as sovereign . . . .” Finley, 524 U.S. at 589.
237
507 U.S. 410 (1993).
238
Id. at 429.
239
Id. at 418.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 429.
242
Id.
243
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
244
Id. at 380–81.
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The Court rejected the notion that unprotected speech can be regulated for any
reason.245 Whether a particular regulation violated the First Amendment depends on
its justification: “The proposition that a particular instance of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but not on the basis of another (e.g.,
opposition to the city government) is commonplace and has found application in many
contexts.”246 According to the Court, by limiting the ordinance to expression on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion, and gender, the city engaged in subject matter and
viewpoint discrimination: subject matter discrimination because the ordinance allowed
the use of fighting words on some topics, such as “political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality”247 but not others, such as religion; and viewpoint discrimination
because it permitted statements containing fighting words in favor of, for example, religious tolerance and equality—“all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten”—but not
in favor of religious intolerance and inequality—“all ‘papists’” are misbegotten.248
Of note, the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the city’s proffered justification
for the ordinance. The city had argued the ordinance was designed “to ensure the basic
human rights of members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination.”249 The Court accepted that this justification was compelling and that the ordinance promoted it.250 But, it reasoned, content and viewpoint discrimination were
unnecessary to achieve the desired end. According to the Court, a broader ban—one
“not limited to the favored topics”—would have the “same beneficial effect.”251 The
poor fit between means and ends thus “cast[ ] considerable doubt on the government’s
protestations that ‘the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the
purpose and effect of the law.’”252 Instead, the Court concluded that the ordinance targeted particular speech out of hostility to the ideas it expressed.253 “That,” the Court
concluded, “is precisely what the First Amendment forbids.”254 In other words, the
Court interpreted St. Paul’s content and viewpoint discrimination as revealing that the
city acted based on an improper motivation.255
From this perspective, the Court was right to conclude that characterizing speech
as unprotected involves oversimplification. Even fighting words may be protected from
government regulation motivated by an impermissible (or disfavored) justification.
R.A.V. thus shows how content and viewpoint discrimination can assist in applying
the constraints on cost-benefit analysis in free speech cases.
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 383–84.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 395 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 213 (1992)).
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
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Viewpoint discrimination, however, does not always reveal an impermissible or
disfavored government motive.256 Even in regard to the third judgment in our framework,257 government does not necessarily violate the Free Speech Clause if its aim in
discriminating by viewpoint is consistent with the very reason the category of speech
is unprotected in the first place.258
Virginia v. Black provides an example. The Court upheld a ban on cross burning
with the intent to intimidate.259 The ban discriminated by point of view, much the way
the ordinance did in R.A.V. People burn crosses to express racial intolerance, not racial
tolerance. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the association between cross burning
and the Ku Klux Klan is “indelible.”260 Yet it held that the ban was constitutional
precisely because the history of cross burning made it “a particularly virulent form of
intimidation.”261 In other words, if the rationale for viewpoint discrimination within
a category of unprotected speech aligns with the very reason the category is unprotected in the first instance, it may be constitutional.262 According to the Court, Black
involved a particularly threatening true threat.263 Thus, understanding the purpose
of attention to viewpoint discrimination provides a basis for reconciling the Supreme
Court’s apparently inconsistent decisions in R.A.V. and Virginia v. Black.264
256

Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia thus went too far by implying viewpoint
discrimination is never permissible. See id. at 388 (“When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable,
no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”).
257
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
258
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
259
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003).
260
Id. at 354.
261
Id. at 363.
262
See id. (“Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light
of cross burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. Thus, just as
a State may regulate only that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content,
so too may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely
to inspire fear of bodily harm.”).
263
Id. at 362, 368 (Stevens, J., concurring).
264
Numerous other examples make the same point. Professor Chemerinsky points out
situations in which the Supreme Court has held that laws that discriminate based on content
do not involve content discrimination: in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court
treated a zoning ordinance that applied to adult movie theatres as content neutral, and it did
the same in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., in regard to an ordinance that prohibited public nudity
as a way to shut down a nude dancing establishment. Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra
note 15, at 59–61. In both cases, the Court treated government action as content neutral even
though it depended on the content of expression: it applied only to theatres that showed adult
movies in Renton and only to dancing involving nudity in Erie. Id. The Court’s odd use of
content neutrality makes sense—as does the “secondary effects” test generally—if the Court
is understood as giving a lower level of protection to sexual speech, protection that applies only
if government acts on a disfavored basis, such as seeking to silence a political message that
sexual speech conveys. See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text. In this context, the
Court labels only disfavored government motivations as content discriminatory.
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4. Conclusion
All three judgments in our framework are necessary, then, to make sense of the
apparent inconsistencies and incoherence regarding content discrimination. No one
principle can explain the doctrine. The same is true for other areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence, as becomes apparent in assessing the work of prominent scholars.
II. FREE SPEECH LAW THROUGH A SCHOLARLY PRISM
Our free speech framework finds confirmation in the work of three renowned
scholars, Robert Post, Jed Rubenfeld, and Richard Posner. In part, this confirmation
is straightforward. Post has developed a theory of free speech that is largely consonant
with our view of the role of government.265 Rubenfeld has made an argument that is
consistent with our focus on the target of government regulation, as well as with the
constraints that apply when courts balance the harms and benefits of restrictions on
expression.266 Posner has championed a pragmatic view that supports our position on
the importance of cost-benefit analysis.267
But there is an additional, subtler way in which the writings of these great scholars
corroborate our approach. We can learn not only from when they are most persuasive,
but also from when their arguments flounder. Unable to capture all of free speech law
by focusing on the role of government, Post labels as inconsistent judicial decisions
that in fact cohere once situated within the second and third judgments in our framework.268 Rubenfeld concedes (without explanation) that role of government is crucial
in some settings269 and he struggles unsuccessfully in contending that courts never
engage in balancing.270 Posner makes key concessions about the formal structure of
free speech doctrine, including the significance of role of government and of the target
of government regulation.271 In each case, a common phenomenon is at work. Each
scholar fails to achieve complete descriptive accuracy as a result of emphasizing only
one of the three judgments in our framework.
A. Post’s Domains and the Role of Government
Post provides wonderful insight about the importance of role of government in
free speech analysis. Indeed, he has developed that insight not only into a theory of
free speech but also of the Constitution as a whole.272 However, Post at times loses
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.A.5.
See infra Part II.B.3.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.C.2.
See generally POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 2.
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sight of the texture of free speech doctrine as it is, as opposed to as it should be. This
is true in a small but significant way even in his account of the part played by role of
government. But his theory fails foremost—at least as a descriptive matter—in regard
to the second and third judgments in our framework. As a result, he characterizes
law as incoherent when in fact it operates on principles that do not conform to his
normative theory.
To understand our analysis of Post some background is necessary. Distilling a
few key points from a complex argument, he carves government action into three
constitutional domains: democracy, management, and community.273 Each domain
correlates reasonably well to the roles of government as we define them.
Democracy is a realm dedicated to a polity’s “self-determination.”274 Free speech
is, of course, a crucial ingredient in self-determination.275 Within the domain of democracy, courts should ensure government does not interfere with free debate and discussion, a process necessary to determine the ends citizens as individuals and society
as a whole should pursue. Democracy holds sway on the public sidewalks, in newspapers and in various other settings. We would say that when government operates
in the democratic domain, it plays the role of regulator.
Management is concerned with giving effect to a polity’s decisions. It thus follows
“the logic of instrumental rationality.”276 In the realm of management, government
must be allowed to constrain speech in service of the goals the democratic process has
assigned to it. School teachers may thus punish students who discuss politics or other
irrelevant topics in mathematics class,277 librarians may require silence in reading
rooms, and prison officials may suppress various forms of speech to further penological ends.278 We would characterize government in this realm as patron, and more
specifically as manager.
Finally, community attends to “a framework of shared beliefs, interests, and commitments,”279 a framework that maintains the norms that “define both individual and
social identity.”280 Among other values, community fosters the “social cohesion necessary to facilitate the processes of collective self-determination.”281 Values that
273

Id.
Id. at 6.
275
Id. at 186 (“[T]he notion that democratic self-determination turns on the maintenance
of a structure of communication open to all commands an extraordinarily wide consensus.”).
276
Id. at 5.
277
Id. at 236 (“[T]he Court has held that student speech, ‘in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969))).
278
Id. at 249–55 (discussing managerial role of government in various contexts); see also
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1988); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 1149.
279
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 3.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 14.
274
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public schools may instill in students—including respect for others—reflect the nation’s
commitment to community.282 Government action in this realm, too, we would characterize as in the role of manager.
In short, democracy is about making decisions, management about implementing
decisions, and community a necessary predicate for both of those endeavors. We
would say that government acts as regulator in the realm of democracy and as patron
in the realms of management and community. To that extent, our view and Post’s
are complementary.
1. Post’s Paradigm Shift: From Speech to Social Practices
Post’s theory of constitutional domains places a premium on social context. What
matters is not whether government action targets “speech as such,”283 but whether, for
example, it interferes with the practice of democracy—by, say, hampering newspapers
or any other “recognized media for the communication of ideas.”284 He summarizes:
“The unit of First Amendment analysis, in other words, ought not to be speech, but
rather particular forms of social structure.”285
Post’s argument in this regard is ambitious: it “would remove us from the dominant First Amendment paradigm that informs the Court’s contemporary doctrine.”286
It is unsurprising, then, that his normative vision might not account for the full pattern
of actual free speech decisions. At a practical level, the two diverge in at least two
ways. First and most significantly, he too readily dismisses doctrines as incoherent
that can make sense when framed in terms of expression or speech, but not in terms
of social practices and constitutional domains. Second, he tends to focus on the
effects of government action rather than on government’s intent. These moves follow naturally—if not as a matter of logical necessity—from Post’s concern about the
impact of government action on social structures.
2. Role of Government
Post’s theory and our framework coincide best in regard to the role of government.
His framework in particular provides a basis for explaining why government as manager may restrict expression, including by discriminating by point of view. Even in
regard to role of government, however, Post’s theory of constitutional domains leads
him a bit astray, particularly when government itself speaks or sponsors speech.
Post’s theory suggests that government participation in the democratic domain should
be suspect, as citizens should define the goals of the community unencumbered by
282
283
284
285
286

Id. at 193.
Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1279.
Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1273 (citing POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 1–20).
Id.
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government. But the actual practice of the courts is to treat government speech like
other speech, as not ordinarily interfering with First Amendment rights.
According to Post’s reasoning, government participation in the democratic
domain is fraught with danger. After all, democracy is supposed to be reserved for
self-determination by citizens.287 As Post’s attention to social realities makes clear,
democratic practices are fragile and government interference with them runs the risk
of subverting meaningful self-determination. As he puts the matter, “the concept of
public discourse requires the state to remain neutral in the ‘marketplace of communities.’”288 If Post’s theory were to describe doctrine accurately, one would expect the
Free Speech Clause to impose significant restrictions on government speaking or sponsoring speech.289 Yet it does not.290
To the contrary, the Supreme Court has shown great—and increasing—deference
to government as speaker or sponsor of speech. Government may choose to pay for
the distribution of information about family planning that does not include abortion,291
subsidize art taking into consideration standards of “decency,”292 or display statues
that reflect some but not all beliefs.293 As noted above, the Court put the matter forthrightly in Summum: “The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. A government entity has a right
to ‘speak for itself.’ ‘It is entitled to say what it wishes,’ and to select the views that
it wants to express.”294
Post deals with this possibility, but largely by attempting to stretch the concept of
government’s managerial capacity to embrace when government speaks or sponsors
speech in the democratic domain.295 He thus struggles to characterize the government’s
role in Rust v. Sullivan as possibly managerial.296 Recall that in Rust the government
provided subsidies for medical advice on family planning, but did not allow dissemination of information about abortion.297 Post proffers as the “most obvious justification”
for the restriction “that the government wished to create family planning clinics that
287

POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 13, at 6.
Id. at 139.
289
See, e.g., Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment
Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979) (arguing for limits on government speech to protect the
“principle of self-government”).
290
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (holding government
may control message it subsidizes); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991) (same).
But cf. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 596 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting possibility that denial of government subsidies could amount to coercion
in some circumstances).
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Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
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Finley, 524 U.S. at 583–84.
293
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1129.
294
Id. at 1131 (citations omitted).
295
Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 38, at 171.
296
Id. at 171–76.
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Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991).
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did not include abortion, and that the HHS regulations served this end.”298 But the
Court itself in Rosenberger explained Rust not as involving government as manager—
running clinics—but rather as speaker communicating its message through others:
“When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message
is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”299
Post’s theory of constitutional domains thus struggles to explain cases like Rust300
and Summum.301 Even in regard to role of government, then, we would claim that
whatever the merits of Post’s theory as a normative matter, it has shortcomings as a
positive account of free speech law. But our disagreement with Post in this regard is
relatively minor. The more significant deficiencies of his approach arise in regard to
the second and third judgments in our framework.
3. Post and the Target of Government Regulation
Post’s theory of constitutional domains—and his corresponding concern about
effects rather than merely government intent302—has caused mischief for his dealings
with the second judgment in our framework, the target of government regulation.
To be sure, Post has a wonderful sense of the contours of free speech case law.
It is therefore unsurprising that in an article that Post entitles Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, he partially recognizes the significance of the target of government regulation for two key areas of free speech law: symbolic (or expressive) conduct
and time, place, or manner regulations.303
But Post criticizes the relevant doctrines as incoherent, in part because, he claims,
they pay insufficient attention to the unintended effects that government regulation has
on expression.304 This, we contend, is an instance of Post’s normative commitments
interfering with his descriptive accuracy. While it is quite plausible to suggest that
doctrine should focus not only on the purpose of government regulation, but also on
its incidental effects on speech—and while courts at times claim to be concerned
with incidental burdens on expression—the outcomes in the relevant cases are best
explained by a simpler proposition: Government violates the Free Speech Clause only
when it aims to interfere with expression.305 Read in light of this proposition, free
speech doctrine coheres.
298

Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 38, at 175.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1994).
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Rust, 500 U.S. 173.
301
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1129 (2009).
302
See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
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Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1250.
304
Id. at 1270.
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See Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 769 (“When a law is otherwise constitutional,
and when an actor has not been singled out because of his expression, the actor has no free
speech claim.”).
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a. Symbolic Conduct
Post’s analysis of symbolic conduct is typical in this regard. As he notes, one way
to assess the applicability of the First Amendment derives from Spence v. Washington.306 The so-called Spence test holds that the Free Speech Clause is implicated whenever conduct (1) is intended “to convey a particularized message” and (2) under the
circumstance “the likelihood [i]s great that the message would be understood” by
its audience.307
Post argues (persuasively) that the Spence test on its own terms is untenable. He
offers as an example a statute imposing criminal sanctions for defacement of public
property.308 As Post explains, application of this statute to a defendant accused of
defacing a city bus would be constitutional, whether the defacement took the form of
spray-painting random blotches of color on the side of the bus or carving a political
message into its seats.309 The fact that the latter would satisfy the Spence test—that
the message would be particularized and would likely be understood by its audience—
simply would not matter.310
This example from Post’s analysis of Spence confirms our argument. The ban
on defacement of property is constitutional because its target is conduct, not speech.
The government’s purpose is to prevent the act damaging public property, not the expression of any message the defendant might thereby convey.311 The First Amendment
therefore does not apply.312
Post also discusses another formulation of the test for whether the First Amendment
applies to symbolic conduct, a test based on the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. O’Brien.313 This test holds, in relevant part, that a restriction on expressive
conduct is constitutional if (1) it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; (2) the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and (3) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.314 As Post recognizes, this test
is extremely permissive and, as applied, “[t]he only portion of the test that has bite
is the inquiry into whether the governmental interest at stake ‘is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.’”315 Incidental effects on expression rarely result in a
306

418 U.S. 405 (1974).
Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1251.
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Id. at 1252.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
313
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
314
Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1263. O’Brien also required that government acted
within its constitutional power, but that is always necessary under the Constitution. See Dorf,
supra note 6, at 1202.
315
Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1263.
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court recognizing a violation under the First Amendment. For this reason he condemns the doctrine.316
But, again, Post’s analysis of free speech doctrine is consistent with our thesis,
which can explain both why courts take into consideration incidental effects on expression and why they rarely strike down a law on that basis.317 If the real concern of
the Court is to determine the target of government regulation, then the key part of the
O’Brien test is an assessment of whether the governmental aim is unrelated to interfering with expression. Attention to incidental effects on speech serves only to detect
pretext.318 Government may provide a justification for a regulation that is unrelated
to the suppression of expression. However, if its incidental effect on speech is great,
that casts doubt on its asserted rationale.319
b. Time, Place, and Manner Regulations
A similar analysis applies to the time, place, and manner doctrine. Post relies on
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence320 for its articulation: such a regulation is constitutional if (1) it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and
(3) it leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of information.321
Post describes the doctrine as “an unmitigated disaster.”322 But the doctrine makes
sense if it is viewed as a way to identify the target of government regulation.
The problem with how courts have applied the Clark test, according to Post, is
that they have focused their attention only on the first criterion, which allows courts
to identify the purpose of government regulation,323 and they have treated the second
and third criteria as “neither rigorous nor critical.”324 As Post acknowledges, courts
tend to uphold government regulations that are not narrowly tailored or that leave only
limited opportunities for communication.325 Courts therefore allow government to
interfere with social practices that are crucial to the vitality of our democracy.326
316

Id. at 1265–67.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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So does attention to governmental interest. All else equal, the less compelling the
proffered government interest, the greater the likelihood that it is pretextual.
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See Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 786–87 (discussing O’Brien test as possible
means of determining target of government regulation).
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468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1261.
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Id.
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Id. at 1256, 1262.
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Id. at 1262; see also Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
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But the way the time, place, and manner doctrine operates in practice makes sense
under our view. A regulation is constitutional if it is not aimed at expression, even if
it is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest or if it leaves little
alternative means for communication.327 These latter two considerations only provide
reason to question the rationale the government offers for a regulation that impinges
on speech.
c. The Alleged Protection from Incidental Burdens
Post claims that his theory regarding social practices finds confirmation in the
Court’s own recognition that unintended effects on expression sometimes trigger the
Free Speech Clause.328 Post cites examples of judicial opinions that suggest the Court
at times has worried about the effect of a regulation on communication, not merely
about its purpose.329 These cases form a potential obstacle to our theory.
In each case, however, government action targeted conduct that was by its nature
expressive: in Schneider v. State, it banned the distribution of only leaflets on government property;330 in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner
of Revenue, it taxed the use of ink and paper only as part of publication;331 and in City
of Ladue v. Gilleo, it banned residential signs.332 The scope of the laws at issue was
defined by the expressive attributes of conduct. Leaflets, publications and signs are
intrinsically expressive.333
Moreover, Post does not contend with the two anomalies about the supposed
application of the Free Speech Clause to incidental burdens on free expression.334
First, as Post admits, this doctrine has proven anemic.335 Rare is the case in which
the courts strike down government action because of an unintended effect on expression.336 Second, when the courts do act on this asserted basis, they often indicate that
a greater restriction—one that would suppress as much or more speech, as well as
other conduct— would be constitutional.337 These anomalies evaporate if the courts
327

See supra Part IB.
Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1264.
329
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and Minneapolis Star).
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note 30, at 831.
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are understood as smoking out pretext, even if they do not always frame their analysis
in that way.
Thus, in Schneider, when the Court struck down ordinances that banned the distribution of leaflets in various contexts,338 it may have been worried about pretext, not
burdens on expression. After all, it stated that a general ban on trespassing that included the conduct at issue would be permissible, but that singling out distribution of
leaflets is not.339 A strict approach to trespass in general would have at least as great an
impact on communication—quite likely a greater one—than a narrow ban on leafleting. But the broader ban runs a much lesser risk of government targeting speech in
the guise of accomplishing some other end.
Similarly, in Minneapolis Star, in rejecting a special tax on ink and paper used
in publication, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that “differential
treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the
goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression . . . .”340 And,
as Rehnquist noted in dissent, a high general tax could impose a greater burden on
expression than a low tax aimed only at the press.341 Minneapolis Star, then, makes
more sense as a case about pretext than about burdens on speech.
Finally, in City of Ladue, in rebuffing a ban on most residential signs, the Court
appeared to accept that the city acted for aesthetic reasons,342 but nonetheless concluded that the ban silenced too much speech.343 Perhaps, as the Court’s reasoning
suggests, its decision turned on an assessment of the burden on expression, not pretext.
On the other hand, the Court might have been influenced by the city’s decision to allow
some expression—including advertisements for the sale or lease of property, and signs
for churches, religious institutions and schools—but not political speech—including
a sign that read, “For Peace in the Gulf.”344 The law at issue smacked of pretext, even
if the Court was reluctant to say so openly.345
Of course, perhaps in a small number of cases courts have rejected government
action based on its incidental effect on expression, and not based on pretext. Still, as
338

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
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Post’s critique of the Spence, O’Brien, and Clark tests confirms, the best description of
free speech law is that it shows little, if any, concern about mere effects on expression.
Courts generally scrutinize regulation under the Free Speech Clause only if expression
is its target.346
4. Constraints on Balancing and Secondary Effects
Post’s concern about social practices, and his attention to effects rather than intent, may explain why he fails to recognize how to recuperate the secondary effects
test. He justly condemns the doctrine on its own terms. But he does not explore the
way in which courts can be understood to use it as a means to detect impermissible (or
disfavored) motivations for restricting expression.
Post criticizes the secondary effects doctrine as it is ordinarily framed because he
claims it lacks any organizing principle.347 As Post notes, when courts invoke secondary effects, they appear to reason that the harm government seeks to avert is not based
on the content of speech348 and that they therefore should subject it to “relatively lax
review.”349 He adopts a view of the doctrine as associating secondary effects with
content neutrality and primary effects with content discrimination.350
Post is skeptical of a doctrine that attempts to categorize restrictions on expression
in this way, noting that it is “haphazard, internally incoherent, and for these reasons
inconsistent with any possible principled concern for content neutrality.”351 The points
he makes in support of this position are powerful, but only insofar as we accept at face
value the role that courts claim the doctrine plays.
The gravamen of Post’s criticism is that courts have failed to articulate a principle for distinguishing between the primary and secondary effects of speech.352 Post
points out that some of the Court’s statements about the secondary effects test appear
to make little sense, including its claim in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement
that a justification based on “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral
basis for regulation.”353
Post offers as a contrast the principle that John Hart Ely articulated for determining
whether “the evil the state is seeking to avert is one that is independent of the message
346

Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1265 (distinguishing between “content-neutral”
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being regulated.”354 Ely suggested focusing on whether a justification for a regulation
would stand even if its target were stripped of its communicative content—for example,
a law banning sound trucks because of the sheer noise they cause.355 As Post points
out, because the ban on sound trucks is based on listeners’ reactions—even if to noise
rather than a message—a literal reading of the Court’s language would result in labeling this law content-based.356 On the other hand, Post explains, the Court has relied
on the secondary effects test in upholding zoning regulations of adult movie theatres,
even though the harms government seeks to avert depend on the reactions of listeners
and would not occur if the movie theatres had simply displayed blank screens.357
Post’s point is that the Court’s approach fails to offer any clear principle—comparable to Ely’s—for determining whether a regulation is content neutral. Because
in Post’s account content neutrality is the best way to define secondary effects, he
believes this difficulty is fatal to the secondary effects doctrine.358
Post, however, makes an important concession consistent with our alternative
understanding of the secondary effects test. He acknowledges that, despite confusion
in the case law, the Court has identified certain justifications for restricting expression
that are primary.359 He asserts, “The Court has so far determined that effects caused by
speech through persuasion or ideas, through the provision of information, or through
the creation of offense, are not secondary.”360
Herein lies the way to salvage the secondary effects test. Rather than identifying innocuous grounds for restricting expression—so-called secondary effects—the
test can be understood as identifying particularly suspect grounds—so-called primary
effects. In other words, the secondary effects test serves to determine those (primary)
justifications that generally are impermissible (or disfavored) as a basis for government regulation of speech. Identifying impermissible (or disfavored) justifications
for restricting expression one at a time provides a principled way to proceed.
5. Content Discrimination
Post’s concern with effects on social practices—rather than with the intent of
government regarding expression—has also prevented him from separating out the
different strands of judicial doctrine dealing with content discrimination. Doing so
allows us to appreciate how attention to content discrimination can help courts to make
each of the judgments in our framework.
354
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Instead, Post characterizes the area of the law dealing with content discrimination
as attempting to enforce a single antidiscrimination principle.361 He complains that,
so understood, case law vacillates in a “haphazard and internally incoherent”362 manner
between addressing discriminatory effects and discriminatory purpose.363
Post illustrates this point first by analyzing Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,364
a case involving an injunction restricting the location and manner of abortion protests.365
The Court concluded that strict regulation of abortion protesters was not necessarily
content or viewpoint based, even though it had the effect of interfering with the speech
of only those who opposed abortion. As Post notes, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, explained that it looked to “the government’s purpose as the threshold
consideration”366 and that discriminatory effect “does not in itself demonstrate that
some invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated”367 government
action. Madsen, then, indicated that discriminatory purpose matters.368
As Post explains, this reasoning is difficult to reconcile with Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.369 In
Renton the Court upheld zoning regulations on adult motion pictures.370 In so doing,
it pronounced, quoting O’Brien: “It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that
this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an
alleged illicit legislative motive . . . .”371 So much for discriminatory purpose.
Similarly, Post points out that in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., the
Court claimed to attend to discriminatory effects rather than purpose.372 At issue was
a city regulation banning news racks that dispensed handbills, but not newspapers.373
The city claimed it was not targeting expression, but was merely worried about safety
and aesthetics. Nevertheless, the Court labeled the regulation as “content based.”374
It reached this conclusion based on the effects of the regulation—which depended on
the content of the publication—“[r]egardless of the mens rea of the city.”375
361
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Post makes a compelling argument that these cases reveal that the Supreme
Court’s concern about content discrimination does not embody a single antidiscrimination principle.376 But, as our framework reveals, another account is available. The
Court uses content discrimination to assist in each of the three judgments that form the
inherent structure of free speech doctrine.377 Seen in this way, Madsen, Renton, and
City of Cincinnati are consistent.
Attention to content discrimination in Madsen and Renton assisted the Court in
assessing whether government acted on an impermissible (or disfavored) motivation,
an issue relevant to the constraints on cost-benefit captured by the third judgment in
our framework. In Madsen, the Court explained that the abortion protesters were being
singled out and subjected to an injunction, not because of hostility to their message,
but merely because they had violated the legal rights of others.378 The Court quoted,
among other precedents, a key statement in R.A.V.: “The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message
expressed.”379 Madsen can be understood, then, as looking to content neutrality to
determine if government acted on a desire to suppress a particular perspective, an
improper motivation. The Court concluded that government had not done so.380
The Court in Renton similarly focused on government motivation. It explained
that “the ordinance d[id] not contravene the fundamental principle that underlies our
concern about ‘content-based’ speech regulations: that ‘government may not grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.’”381 The Court made
clear the relevance of the concept of content neutrality to the case before it: courts are
skeptical of regulations whose aim is to hamper the expression of disfavored or controversial views. According to the Court, no such concern was at play in Renton.382
If it had been, the Court likely would have decided the case based on the government’s
motivation, notwithstanding its claim to the contrary.
The Court’s use of content neutrality was quite different in City of Cincinnati.
The city’s argument was that its regulation merely addressed the time, place, or manner of presenting speech and was, in that sense, content-neutral.383 It claimed its goal
was merely to decrease the number of news racks on public property, a goal motivated by concern about safety and aesthetics.384 In other words, the city was arguing
376
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in essence that expression was not the target of its regulation, a point relevant to the
second judgment in our framework.
The Court accepted this framing of the issue, offering as an example of a time,
place, and manner regulation “a prohibition against the use of sound trucks emitting
‘loud and raucous’ noise in residential neighborhoods.”385 Such a prohibition is not
really aimed at expression, but rather at the non-expressive attributes of expressive
behavior. Understood in this way, the Court plausibly found the regulation content
based, that is, that the city’s target was the expressive content of the commercial handbills, as opposed to the content of newspapers. The Court’s conclusion followed naturally that the Free Speech Clause applied.386 And in making this judgment, the Court
considered the purpose—not just the effects—of government action.387
In sum, Post is wrong to condemn the cases about content neutrality as incoherent.
The key is not to take content discrimination as addressing a single concern. Instead,
this body of case law can be understood as attending to content discrimination to assist
in each of the three judgments in our framework.
6. Conclusion
Post, more than any other scholar, has recognized and explored the importance of
role of government for free speech doctrine. But his emphasis on the role of government—and on the social context in which government action is situated—has led him
astray on some key points, particularly when it comes to the second and third judgments in our framework. Unable to explain parts of the pattern of judicial decisions
within his preferred theoretical structure, he gives up too readily on organizing them.
He may be right about what free speech doctrine should be, but his account does not
fully capture what it is.
B. Rubenfeld’s Purposivism and the Target of Regulation
Rubenfeld’s view of free speech law is based on an anti-orthodoxy principle—
that government may not require its citizens to conform to an orthodox view on matters of opinion.388 In furtherance of this position, he develops “purposivism,” an
approach to the Free Speech Clause that is self-consciously at odds with cost-benefit
analysis.389 Purposivism limits free speech doctrine to an inquiry into the purpose of
government action. A cardinal virtue of this approach, according to Rubenfeld, is
385
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that it permits courts to avoid an unworkable and undesirable balancing in protecting
free speech rights.390
He attempts to reduce free speech law in effect to a single proposition: government violates the Free Speech Clause if and only if its purpose is to restrict expression
(other than of false facts).391 Rubenfeld offers powerful arguments in favor of the
claim that the Free Speech Clause applies only if expression—not conduct—is the
target of government regulation.392 But he is much less persuasive in arguing that
courts never engage in balancing in deciding whether to allow government to regulate
opinion or true factual assertions.393 And he concedes, without adequate explanation,
that government in its managerial capacity may restrict expression, even of opinion.394
1. The Target of Government Regulation
Rubenfeld begins his argument by focusing on doctrines that address expressive
(or symbolic) conduct. In particular, much like Post, he explores the inadequacies of
the tests articulated in O’Brien and Spence.395
O’Brien involved prosecution of a man for burning his draft card in protest of the
Vietnam War. The Court upheld the conviction.396 In so doing, recall that the Court
considered: (1) whether government thereby enforced an important or substantial governmental interest; (2) whether the governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (3) whether the incidental restriction on expression
was no greater than essential in furtherance of that interest.397
Rubenfeld offers a clever reductio ad absurdum that reveals the failings of this
approach.398 Imagine, he suggests, that person A is ticketed for speeding. A claims that
the ticket violates his free speech rights. In support of this position, he makes only one
argument: “that a higher speed limit would have been safer and more fuel efficient.”399
As Rubenfeld points out, if we take the O’Brien test literally, an absurdity results
regarding its third step. After all, speeding can be a form of expression (indeed, any
illegal act may express opposition to its illegality). So there is an incidental restriction on expression.400 And the speed limit may not in fact promote the relevant
390
Id. (“Among other things, purposivism would eliminate most of the cost-benefit,
balancing-test rhetoric so common in today’s free speech jurisprudence. The language of
balancing in First Amendment law, appealing as it may seem, is unacceptable in its implications and unnecessary in the cases where it is supposedly indispensable.”).
391
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interests.401 A may be able to show that a higher speed limit would be both safer and
more fuel efficient. If so, the actual speed limit—when compared to a higher speed
limit—imposes a greater restriction on expression than is necessary to serve the governmental interests at play.402 And in the guise of evaluating free speech rights, a court
considering this argument would be forced to assess the wisdom of legislative policies
for reasons entirely unrelated to expression.
But, of course, this result—and form of judicial reasoning—would be absurd.
It is hard to imagine a court following O’Brien so mindlessly. As Rubenfeld rightly
points out, a court would intuitively recognize the flaw in A’s claim: in enacting a
speeding law, government’s target is conduct, not speech.403 It simply does not matter
whether A happens to use that conduct as a means of expression. So A not only has
not stated a winning claim under the Free Speech Clause; properly understood, he
has not stated a claim that implicates free speech at all.
Rubenfeld makes a similar point about the Spence test. Spence, as Rubenfeld
explains, provides a gloss on when conduct is sufficiently expressive to implicate free
speech rights.404 Recall that under Spence a judge must inquire whether the speaker
possessed “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and whether “the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”405 Spence
would seem to provide a solution to the hypothetical involving A. Even if A intended
to express a particularized message by speeding, others would be unlikely to understand what he hoped to convey.406 But the Spence test creates difficulties of its own.
To make this point, Rubenfeld offers another illustration. Imagine, he suggests,
that B is arrested for wearing a shirt bearing a particular symbol. He claims a First
Amendment violation, arguing persuasively that the legislature criminalized the shirt
because the symbol on it protests against state police practices.407 But B acknowledges he was unaware of the meaning of the shirt when he wore it. He just thought
“it looked cool.”408
Taking Spence literally—much like O’Brien—would produce a silly (or scary)
outcome. B’s lack of intent to express a particularized message would mean that he
cannot rely on the Free Speech Clause. The legislature’s suppression of protest would
succeed. And so, indeed, would its prohibition of any art that either is not intended to
express a particularized message or that is apt to produce confusion in viewers rather
than a great likelihood of understanding a particularized message. This will not do.
401
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The problem with Spence is that it appears to focus on the perspective of the
speaker (or audience). As Rubenfeld notes, the absurdity of B’s plight disappears as
soon as we recognize that what matters is the government’s perspective.409 If the target of government regulation is expression—as it is by assumption in B’s situation—
then the Free Speech Clause applies.410
As Rubenfeld explains, we can nevertheless make sense of O’Brien’s focus on
governmental interests and incidental burdens on expression.411 Inquiry into these
matters assists a court to smoke out pretext—to determine whether government’s
target is really expression, even though government claims otherwise. And O’Brien
itself is thereby revealed as dodging the crucial issue in the case before it: the Court
should not have accepted uncritically the government’s assertion that it banned the
burning of draft cards for reasons unrelated to the act as an expression of protest
against the war.
Rubenfeld could have added at least one more doctrine to his exposition: the test
for time, place, and manner regulations. As noted above, not only do courts have to
determine when government regulates expression in the guise of regulating conduct,
but also when government regulates conduct but appears to regulate expression. This
is the best reading of the time, place, and manner doctrine, a point consistent with
Rubenfeld’s purposivism.412
Rubenfeld does address how courts deal with incidental burdens on expression,413
a potential challenge to his—and our—framework. Along these lines, he notes the
disparate treatment of general taxes and taxes aimed only at forms of expression,
such as newspapers.414 He suggests that a high general tax may suppress a great deal
of expression, whereas a low general tax and a slightly higher tax imposed on news
publications might allow for a great deal of expression.415 But, as he explains, the
former tax raises no issues under the Free Speech Clause, while the latter tax does.416
The explanation, as Rubenfeld recognizes, is that general taxes are not aimed at
expression whereas taxes that single out newspapers are.417
409
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2. A Constrained Cost-Benefit Analysis: Unexplained Case Law
Rubenfeld’s argument begins to break down when it comes to areas of the law in
which courts allow government to restrict expression in service of various governmental interests. Even in this regard, he makes an important point: courts do not
always engage in an unstructured, case by case balancing.418 But he attempts to go
further, arguing that courts should never restrict expression based on a cost-benefit
analysis and that they (almost?) never do.419 While this argument has some normative force, it is not descriptively accurate.
a. Constraints on Balancing
Rubenfeld is on firmest footing insofar as he claims courts do not always engage
in case by case balancing in deciding free speech cases. He offers various contexts
in which courts should—and generally would—reject government restrictions on
expression even if they could be justified in that manner.420
Notable examples include the antiwar and civil rights demonstrations of past
decades,421 and the teaching of Islam or espousing of Islamic fundamentalism today.422
Constitutional protection of each of these forms of expression might not survive a
cost-benefit analysis. As Rubenfeld observes, under Posner’s version of that approach,
judges may choose not to protect speech that is “‘felt’ to ‘pose a threat to American
institutions and decencies.’”423 The government might feel these forms of expression
pose just that kind of threat, and many federal judges might agree. And yet that is not
how most judges would address the issue.424 They would say that government cannot restrict speech merely because it is offensive, particularly when it expresses a
particular political or religious point of view.425
Rubenfeld makes a similar—if more subtle—point in regard to the incitement
doctrine.426 As Rubenfeld acknowledges, on its face the doctrine appears to allow
judges to engage in a cost-benefit analysis.427 But Rubenfeld argues that current
418
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incitement law does not embody a pure cost-benefit analysis. Under Brandenburg,
government may punish speech only when it is “intended and likely to induce imminent unlawful conduct.”428 As Rubenfeld explains, the focus on intention and imminence is oddly constraining. What should matter are the magnitude and probability
of harm.429 Yet we do not allow judges to prevent incitement of substantial harms that
may occur in the distant future. This point supports Rubenfeld’s argument that judges
are not permitted to engage in an unstructured balancing in all free speech cases.430
However, Rubenfeld struggles in resisting the notion that balancing sometimes
plays a role in incitement cases.431 For example, one explanation of the requirement
of imminence is that we do not trust judges with unfettered discretion.432 According
to this view, only if harms are sufficiently immediate and concrete are we willing to
allow them to silence speech as incitement.433 The greater the delay, the more speculative the harm and the higher the risk that judges will have exaggerated the consequences of speech.434 While this plausible account does not refute Rubenfeld’s claim
that courts are not free to engage in any sort of balancing in free speech cases, it does
tend to undermine his categorical rejection of balancing.435
And his alternative account of incitement doctrine is a stretch. He argues that
Brandenburg “allows speech to be prohibited not because of its harmfulness, but because the speaker seeks there and then to bring about a particularized, prohibited, and
prohibitable course of conduct.”436 In other words, although government appears to
be targeting speech, it is actually targeting conduct. The problem is that government
really is targeting expression. The impact on conduct is indirect. In other settings,
Rubenfeld rightly rejects the notion that government may evade scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause by targeting expression as an indirect means to affect conduct.437
His selective reliance on this sort of reasoning is unpersuasive.
428
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Rubenfeld also has trouble explaining cases in which the courts have allowed government
to silence expression out of a fear of non-imminent risks. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951), provides an example. The Court upheld a restriction on political dissent. Id. Posner
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b. Balancing
Indeed, there are a number of contexts in which courts engage in balancing in free
speech cases—and which Rubenfeld has to explain away, ignore, or criticize. In the
end, he just cannot make a compelling argument that cost-benefit analysis has no place
in free speech law.
i. False Factual Assertions
One of the most significant difficulties for Rubenfeld in this regard is the exception he makes for government regulation of false factual assertions.438 This exception
is flawed in part because it is both over- and under-inclusive.
It is over-inclusive because government may not restrict false factual assertions
in all settings.439 Holocaust deniers and political candidates almost certainly would be
protected from government interference with their false factual statements. If a politician argued for—or against—trickle down economics in a television commercial, and
in the process flatly misstated key historical facts—regarding, say, the gross national
product or the unemployment rate in particular years—would Rubenfeld really allow
the government to impose some kind of punishment?440 Posner raises this issue in response to Rubenfeld’s purposivism,441 and Rubenfeld simply ignores it in his article
responding to Posner.442
Rubenfeld’s approach to false facts is also under-inclusive. Government may
punish speech in some contexts even if it does not contain false facts.443 Rubenfeld
acknowledges that this is true of medical malpractice, an awkward reality that he
attempts to explain away as a “false ‘factual opinion.’”444 But what of bans on nondoctors and non-lawyers providing, respectively, accurate medical and legal advice?
And what of forced disclosures under the federal securities laws, restrictions on advertising of prescription drugs and alcoholic beverages, and requirements regarding the
manner in which truthful information is presented under consumer protection laws?
In these instances, government regulates far more than merely false factual assertions
or even false factual opinions.
438

Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 819.
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See Rubenfeld, Purpose, supra note 30, at 792–93 (noting political dissent is protected,
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Rubenfeld’s explanation for why false factual assertions are allegedly unprotected
is that our constitutional law embodies an anti-orthodoxy principle, but one that extends
only to expressions of opinion, not of fact.445 In so doing, he relies on a supposed difference in the epistemology of matters of fact and opinion.446 Facts, he claims, enjoy
a privileged epistemic status in our modern, Western society, whereas opinions are relegated to an inferior epistemic status.447 He notes the “irony” that the epistemic privilege
we accord facts—that they can be right or wrong—means we afford lesser protection
to expressions of fact than we do to the expression of “the very ideas and attitudes that
are supposed to be epistemically underprivileged.”448
Here Rubenfeld does not, as he so often does, reveal the core of the issue, but instead in large measure obscures it. After all, a politician is just as protected when she
expresses a false fact—for example, that our gross domestic product has grown only
under Republican (or Democratic) Presidents—as when she expresses an opinion—
that Republican economics are superior (or inferior) to Democratic economics.449 Or,
to take another example, imagine if a scientific journal published an article arguing
that no empirical evidence supports the theory of relativity or of quantum mechanics.
Could the journal, or the author, really be subject to sanction by the government, even
if the article were rife with demonstrably false assertions? Something is afoot other
than epistemic hierarchy.
A more persuasive explanation is that courts separate out different justifications for
restricting expression. When the aim of regulation is to ensure fair commercial interactions, government has a relatively free hand. Government may punish the deliberate
assertion of false facts as part of a contract regarding the quality of goods or services.
And it may attach legal consequences to the provision of certain kinds of commercial
services, including through malpractice law. Government may even prohibit citizens
from offering true factual opinions—again, non-doctors and non-lawyers—as part
of a regime to ensure the competence of medical and legal professionals.
But when government aims to regulate political debate, it is much more constrained. It may not police the assertions of fact or opinion of politicians, activists,
or others involved in political discussion or argument.
The ultimate reason for this distinction may be based on a kind of cost-benefit
analysis. The benefits of restricting certain kinds of expression in a commercial setting
are worth the cost. But for various reasons the same is not true in a political setting.450
Indeed, Rubenfeld comes close to conceding this role of balancing. Here is the nub
of his explanation for why government may regulate (some) false factual assertions:
445
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Why is it tolerable for state actors to declare the truth about how
many miles a certain car has been driven, but not how many gods
there are? The answer is in part that an injunction against false
statements of fact is an orthodoxy that no legal system—indeed
no communicative system—can do without. It would not be possible to have law or even to conceive of law without embracing the
practice of fact-finding. The anti-orthodoxy principle is not selfimmolating, as a rejection of the idea of true and false facts would
necessarily be (“there is no such thing as a true or false fact—and
that’s a fact”). The anti-orthodoxy principle repudiates the concept of heresy; it does not repudiate the concept of fact.451
Understood most simply, in this passage Rubenfeld can be read as acknowledging
that the costs of protecting false factual assertions exceed the benefits. That may be
in part what he means when he says “no legal system”452—and “no communicative
system”453—could do without “orthodoxy” of factual belief.454 To be precise, however, he would have to add that no legal system could function without enforcing that
orthodoxy by prohibiting some false factual assertions, at least in commercial settings.
If this is Rubenfeld’s point, it is persuasive, but only at the cost of abandoning his purposivism. For he would in effect be allowing government to target expression based
on a cost-benefit analysis.
If, instead, Rubenfeld’s claim is that as a philosophical matter government must
be able to ban false factual assertions in order to recognize the possibility of factual
truth, then that is a non sequitur. For there is a distinction between, on one hand, permitting the state to declare factual truth (or to act on factual truth) and, on the other
hand, allowing the state to prevent its citizens from making false factual assertions. The
denial of factual truth may be philosophically unsound and even self-contradictory.
In contrast, a decision to bar government from punishing citizens for making false factual assertions would be perfectly sensible and coherent. If there is a reason to allow
government to restrict (some) false factual assertions, it cannot rest on Rubenfeld’s
philosophical argument about the nature of truth.
ii. Offensive Expression
Similar problems beset Rubenfeld’s treatment of nude dancing and adult movies.
Indeed, Rubenfeld admits that pornography should receive the same formal treatment
as other speech under his approach.455 But he ignores that non-obscene pornography
451
452
453
454
455
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is restricted in ways that other speech is not. Courts, for example, allow the zoning of
establishments that display adult movies and the like.456 Similar zoning of political
speech would—and should—be unconstitutional.457 Consider a zoning ordinance that
applies only to establishments that host “poetry slams.” Surely Rubenfeld would not
countenance a government decision to sequester the slams in a narrow area of a city.
Of course, the Supreme Court in Renton relied on the secondary effects test to explain the zoning of adult movie theatres.458 But Rubenfeld should reject this explanation. After all, he points out that government regulations that target expression— even
if only to get at the indirect consequences of that expression—violate his preferred view
of the law.459 So if Rubenfeld were to undertake the kind of withering interrogation
of the secondary effects test that he performs on other doctrines, he would not accept
it at face value.
Nor could Rubenfeld treat pornographic movies or nude dancing as something
other than expression. True, one of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Barnes contended that nudity is not an expressive element of nude dancing460 and another that
nude dancing is conduct, not expression.461 But Rubenfeld has revealed his agreement
with Posner that these views reflect an improper faith in the ability of judges to “make
plausible measurements of ‘expressive value’ or ‘aesthetic quality.’”462
Finally, it is also true that blue movies and nude dancing may not communicate a
clear message. But as Rubenfeld points out, failing to protect expression for this reason
would leave a great deal of art at risk, a consequence he understandably rejects.463
Rubenfeld, then, has a hard time explaining government restrictions on adult
movies and nude dancing.464 The most plausible view is that these forms of expression
are provided only limited protection because they are considered by many to be offensive and because courts weigh the value of sparing people that offense against the value
of the lost expression. That is an explanation that conflicts directly with Rubenfeld’s
456

See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986).
See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
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Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (“Moreover, the Renton ordinance is ‘narrowly tailored’ to affect
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purposivism. But Rubenfeld offers no alternative.465 Indeed, Posner raises a point
along these lines in critiquing Rubenfeld’s theory,466 and Rubenfeld provides no rejoinder to it in his reply.467
iii. Obscenity
Rubenfeld has similar difficulties explaining the obscenity doctrine. But on this
point he is more straightforward. He simply admits that “banning obscenity would
almost certainly be unconstitutional” under his approach.468
iv. Speech as Conduct
Finally, there is the cluster of doctrines that treat speech as conduct. Rubenfeld
places in this category “agreements to commit unlawful acts (conspiracy), solicitations
of unlawful acts, [and] threats,”469 and in a novel twist, incitement.470 This is the sort
of traditional doctrinal distinction that Rubenfeld would likely dismantle if it were not
necessary to make his purposivism work. As noted above, Eugene Volokh has argued
that courts would likely achieve far greater analytic clarity—and more sensible results—if they were to acknowledge that speech is speech, not conduct,471 and that when
they treat speech as conduct they are evading a proper explanation of their decision
under the First Amendment, not supplying one.472 The same holds true for Rubenfeld.
3. Role of Government: A Concession
Rubenfeld makes a final important concession: that government may target expression in its managerial capacity.473 (He does not address—but presumably would
concede—that government may also speak or sponsor speech.) This point poses a
problem for purposivism. Government may require its employees to express particular points of view as part of their work, as it did in Garcetti.474 Posner has criticized
Rubenfeld for failing to explain this exception to his general argument.475 Rubenfeld’s
reply does not engage the issue.476
465
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467
468
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4. Conclusion
In the end, Rubenfeld is persuasive that only if government targets expression
does the Free Speech Clause apply, and when it does, that courts do not always engage
in unstructured balancing. He cannot carry his burden, however, of showing courts
never employ cost-benefit analysis, nor does he attempt to deny the first judgment in
our framework regarding role of government.
C. Posner’s Pragmatism and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Judge Richard Posner’s analysis comes closest to identifying the third judgment
in our framework, a constrained cost-benefit analysis. His approach to speech is in
keeping with his view of the law generally. He is of course famous—or notorious—
for attempting to make sense of the law in a pragmatic manner, often through recourse
to the tools of law and economics and with a focus on wealth maximization. From
this perspective, all judicial doctrines balance consequences.477 It is no surprise, then,
that Posner would extend this view to the First Amendment.
Posner’s pragmatism provides a healthy corrective to various judicial pieties about
the protection we afford speech. The reasons government may regulate expression are
numerous and their consequences profound. Courts resist this reality.
To be sure, judges at times acknowledge their willingness to sacrifice free speech
to other governmental interests.478 However, in many other contexts they are less
forthright. They invoke empty distinctions as a way to mask the trade-off that is taking place—suggesting, for example, that speech is tantamount to conduct, that government is regulating not speech but its secondary effects, and the like.479 Indeed, in many
settings judges act as if there is no First Amendment interest at stake when the reality
is that government is regulating speech, but in a manner so routine that they are unconcerned.480 Examples include the law of contracts, prohibitions on fraud, and intellectual property rights. Posner’s pragmatic approach to free speech law allows a candid
recognition of how frequently we privilege other policy concerns over free speech.
But Posner’s account of free speech law is incomplete, at least as a descriptive
matter. In making a philosophical point, he is too dismissive of its formal structure.
As a result, he loses the trees for the forest. In responding to Jed Rubenfeld’s argument for purposivism, Posner “urg[es] the unworkability of a formalist approach to
free speech, even one defended on pragmatic grounds.”481 In general, then, Posner
477
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seems to claim courts should engage in case by case cost-benefit analysis in free
speech cases.482
This argument does not capture all of the case law. It fails to account, for
example, for decisions that impose a constraint on the justifications for restricting
expression. Moreover, Posner at times makes important concessions about the first
and second judgments in our framework. At one point he acknowledges the significance of role of government in free speech law—citing it as an embarrassment for
Rubenfeld’s position.483 And he appears to recognize that courts generally do not
apply the Free Speech Clause to government action aimed at conduct that has only
an incidental effect on expression.484
1. Constrained Cost-Benefit Analysis
The strength of Posner’s argument lies in his recognition of the many ways in
which courts allow government to restrict expression. In criticizing Rubenfeld’s purposivism, for example, Posner identifies a host of situations in which courts allow government to restrict various forms of expression including: begging; offers to fix prices,
sell illegal drugs, or commit murder for hire; and harassing phone calls, whether to
collect debts or engage in sexual harassment.485 Posner might have added to this list
intellectual property rights, contractual commitments, and a host of other examples.
Given that these laws target expression, they are difficult for Rubenfeld to explain.
Posner is not sympathetic to constraints on this cost-benefit analysis. Responding
to Rubenfeld’s categorical claim that government should not be permitted to squelch
political dissent, even if it may lead to eventual violence, Posner notes that is just what
the Supreme Court did in response to the threat of Communism in Dennis v. United
States.486 He similarly suggests that “offensiveness” can suffice to uphold restraints
482

But see id. at 740 (“[A] pragmatist might reject the use of balancing tests in First
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than case-by-case balancing—is insufficient to contradict Posner’s philosophical position.
485
See id. at 746.
486
Id. at 741 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).

192

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:131

on expression, as occurs today when government bans particularly offensive pornography—“mainly child pornography”487—as well as when it regulates adult movie
theatres, pornographic book stores or nude dancing, or when it prohibits public displays of pornography and prevents children from otherwise gaining access to it.488
However, Posner fails to contend with cases reflecting the constraints on this costbenefit analysis. Consider R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.489 He does not explain why
fighting words—which courts have determined to have very little value—should be
protected when they may do significant harm—as hate speech arguably does.490 Nor
does Posner explain why the Court in R.A.V. expressed willingness to uphold a greater
ban on speech—all fighting words—but not a lesser ban that would, presumably, come
at a lower cost.491 R.A.V. and similar cases pose a problem for the suggestion that free
speech law embodies unstructured case by case balancing.
A similar point applies to Posner’s treatment of the secondary effects test. Posner
rightly criticizes the doctrine, recognizing that it does not provide an adequate explanation for the ways in which we allow government to restrict pornography.492 True,
he notes, pornography may “engender” noxious conduct, such as “prostitution” or
“disorderly conduct.”493 But politically unpopular speech can have similar consequences. Yet we require government to regulate those consequences directly and not
the speech that causes them.494 He suggests we would do the same with pornography
if we thought it as valuable as political dissent.495 To this extent, he is on the mark.
But that does not mean the secondary effects test serves no purpose.
Posner’s doubts about formalism may explain his failure to recognize the work
that a reconstituted secondary effects test can do. As explained above, the secondary
effects test makes sense as a means for screening out impermissible (or disfavored) justifications for restricting expression rather than for identifying permissible (or favored)
justifications.496 Posner may be right, then, that courts rely on secondary effects to regulate pornographic but not political speech because they are less concerned about pornography than politics.497 Yet he misses that courts generally do not allow regulation
487
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of either one on certain bases, including out of fear that it will ultimately prove persuasive.498 For this reason, confining all nude dancing to a red light district might be
permissible, but confining nude dancing only if it lampoons the government would
not be.499 Posner’s view is thus incomplete to the extent he fails to contend with constraints on the cost-benefit analysis in the third judgment in our framework.
2. Role of Government and Target of Government Regulation
In an article criticizing Rubenfeld’s purposivism, Posner also makes crucial
concessions about the formal nature of free speech doctrine regarding what we have
labeled the first and second judgments in its inherent structure.500
a. Role of Government
Along these lines, in taking Rubenfeld to task Posner leaves room for the importance of role of government in free speech law. He notes that Rubenfeld concedes
government may restrict expression on its own property, including military bases, and
more generally when it performs a managerial, as opposed to regulatory, function.501
In making this point, Posner in effect concedes that a formal analysis of role of government may play a key part in free speech doctrine (although he would rest his view
“on pragmatic grounds”).502
b. Target of Regulation
Similarly, in responding to Rubenfeld, Posner appears at one point to acknowledge
that courts generally will not strike down laws that have a large, but only incidental
effect, on expression.503 To be sure, he frames the point somewhat differently than
we do. He notes that “measures that have a really big impact on speech are regularly
ignored by the courts, which, however, pounce on tiny ones.”504 And he characterizes
the kinds of restrictions on speech that courts scrutinize as “direct,”505 suggesting that
498
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courts generally tolerate restrictions on speech that are indirect or, as we would put
the point, incidental.506
The illustrations Posner offers confirm that he is in effect accommodating the
second judgment in our framework. He acknowledges the substantial impact on speech
of various laws of general applicability—ones that are not aimed at expression—
including increases to the price of third-class mail and various taxes that extend to
communication (on entertainment, telephones, author royalties, and the like).507 And
he notes that courts “ignore[ ]” these “measures.”508 Indeed, Posner even concedes that
this aspect of free speech law provides an “argument against balancing.”509
To be clear, Posner contests Rubenfeld’s purposivism.510 The thrust of his argument, however, is that courts sometimes uphold the regulation of expression on a costbenefit basis,511 a proposition with which we agree. He makes no similarly systematic
argument that courts will strike down restrictions on conduct because of their incidental
effect on expression.
True, at least one of Posner’s contentions runs contrary to the point he appears to
concede: that regulation is constitutional if its purpose is to regulate conduct, not expression. The contention is that identifying legislative purpose is too difficult to be
practical.512 But it is hard to take this argument seriously. Could such an endeavor
really be more challenging than assessing and balancing the undetectable, unquantifiable and incommensurable costs and benefits of restricting expression?513 Could it
be less practical than balancing the offense caused by nude dancing and weighing it
against the loss of valuable expression?
In reality, the problem of determining government purpose is no more vexing than
that of balancing; it simply requires courts to look at the evidence available and exercise their best judgment, as they do in so many contexts.514 In this regard, Posner is
guilty of using the kind of argument for which he criticizes Rubenfeld: “The academic
tactic of studied obtuseness, of making the easy seem difficult in order to score a
point.”515 Of course, it is not necessarily easy to assess government’s purpose, but
it is feasible, just as it is feasible to engage in balancing.
506
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While Posner’s argument, then, does significant damage to the claim that courts
never allow restrictions of expression of opinion on a cost-benefit basis, he strikes at
most a glancing blow to our view: that regulation aimed at conduct falls outside of the
purview of the Free Speech Clause. Indeed, at times he seems to accept this formal
proposition, explaining it in terms of costs and benefits.516 “The direct regulations of
speech,” he contends, “often have a smaller effect on the speech market, but the bad
consequences of prohibiting such regulations are immensely smaller.”517 That claim
at most justifies the formal rule in pragmatic terms; it does not refute its formalism.
In sum, Posner focuses his criticism on only part of Rubenfeld’s purposivism.
Posner correctly denies that government restriction of the expression of opinion is
always unconstitutional (a host of examples make that claim untenable), but he does not
similarly undermine the claim that government regulation aimed at conduct does not
violate the Free Speech Clause, even if it has a large incidental impact on expression.518
3. Conclusion
In significant measure, Posner’s arguments are compatible with our framework,
notwithstanding his suggestion to the contrary. He does not foreclose the formal
structure we contend is immanent in judicial decisions.
CONCLUSION
Our framework explains free speech doctrine as it is, not necessarily as it should
be. A simplistic view would be that the framework comports only with positivism—a school of thought that distinguishes between these two understandings of the
law.519 But it is consistent as well with the belief that description always entails
normative judgment.520
Consider the interpretive theory of Ronald Dworkin, who has made perhaps the
strongest case against positivism. He recognizes two dimensions of any interpretive
516
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As Posner explains, Rubenfeld acknowledges that this action should be unconstitutional
“because such a high percentage of campaign spending is on communication.” Id. Posner in
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endeavor: fit and justification.521 Fit is descriptive.522 In regard to case law, an interpretation fits if it makes sense of the outcomes—and perhaps the reasoning—of the
relevant precedents.523 Justification is normative.524 In a legal context, it attends to
how attractive an interpretation is from the perspective of justice.525 The two interact.
The more compelling the justification for a particular interpretation, the greater leeway
it should be allowed in regard to fit, and vice-versa.526 In Dworkin’s terms, our argument is that our framework fits the outcomes in free speech cases far better than the
alternatives we discuss.
To be sure, other scholars have provided strong justifications for parts of our
framework: Post regarding role of government; Rubenfeld regarding the target of
regulation and constraints on balancing; and Posner regarding cost-benefit analysis.
And the judgments in our framework fit the general structure of constitutional rights,
addressing, respectively, whether the Constitution applies, whether the Free Speech
Clause applies, and how to apply the Free Speech Clause. But we leave the issue of
justification largely for another day.
Indeed, we believe excessive normativity has created problems for characterizing
free speech law. It has led scholars to perceive only part of its structure. Post’s theory
of constitutional domains and social practices has led him to place undue emphasis
on the role of government; Rubenfeld’s hostility to balancing has caused him to exaggerate the significance of the target of government regulation; and Posner’s penchant
for pragmatism and resistance to formal reasoning have left him focusing only on costbenefit analysis. Perhaps cabining in normativity is essential to perceiving free speech
law as it really is.
What applies to scholars in this regard also pertains to judges. Soaring rhetoric
about free speech law is difficult to reconcile with actual practice. Judges at times
make heroic claims: free speech is an absolute right;527 government may never engage
in content discrimination.528 But the categorical claims turn out to be qualified, and
even as qualified they are readily circumvented. Expression is somehow conduct, not
speech. Government is not regulating speech itself, but only its secondary effects.
And so on. Candid recognition of the contours of the right to free speech may make
it appear somewhat more modest than we thought it to be. But it may also steel us not
let it become more modest yet. Or it may spur us to make it nobler.
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